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CURRENT ECONOMIC ISSUES IN EMPLOYEE BENEFItS

Stephen A. Woodbury
W. E. Upjohn Insti~ute for Employment Research and
Michigan State University

I.

Introduction

For at least three reasons, employee benefits have become a celltral
issue in employee compensation in recent yeals, rivaling wage levels and
wage changes as a topic of research and policy debate.
benefits constitute a far greater proportion of total
than at th6 end of World War II.

First, employee
compensati~n

today

This remains true even though, as will

be shown, the growth of employee benefits as a proportion of
compensation has slowed ill the 1980s.

Understanding tr . reasons for the

growth or lack of growth of employee benefits is clearly
general understanding of worker compensation.

impor~ant

to a

Second, the significance

of the two private employee benefits on which dollar expenditures are
largest--pensions and health insurance--has been enhanced by an
increasing recognition that both are in part public goods.

Both

retirement income and health care in the U.S. are provided by a dual
public-private system in which the private components play a pivotal
role.

Third, in recognition of the public-goods aspects of pensions and

health insurance, those benefits have been subject to an increasing
r.umber of regulations and sp€,ial tax provisions during the past two
decades.

How these influences have altered the provision of employee

benefits has been the subject of considerable research, although many
questions remain.
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This paper offers a treatment of the economic issues surrounding
employee benefits.

Although it would be impossible to offer a thorough

treatment Qf all the issues encompassed by employee benefits in a short
piece, the attempt is to touch on the important issues, and to point in
appropriate directions when fuller treatment is not given.
The plan of the paper is as follows.

Section II discusses recent

trends in employee benefits, and attempts to place employee benefits in
the context of nonwage labor costs generally.

Section II also includes

a discussion of employee benefit coverage and how coverage is related to
various worker characteristics.

An important goal of Section II is to

answer questions about who is covered by what benefits, and why.
Section III describes what recent research has found regarding
recent trends in voluntary employee benefits, and the reasons for those
trends.

Although further research on this topic is necessary, existing

evidence suggests that changes in real income and marginal tax rates go
a long way toward explaining trends in the provision of private pensions
and health insurance.
Section IV is an attempt to develop guidelines and norms for
evaluating changes ill the tax treatment and regulation of employee
benefits.

Static econoillic efficiency, capital accumulation and economic

growth, and issues of equity and income distribution
Section V describes some recently

co~pleted

ar~

all considered.

estimates of how

changing the tax treatment of employee benefits would alter
compensation, federal revenues, and income

dist~ibution.

The estimates

presented are intended to contribute to the following questions.

Should

employer contributions to employee benefit plans be taxed as income, or
2134
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should the current policy of favorable tax treatment be continued?

If

employer contributions are taxed. should contributions to all types of
plans be taxed. or only

contribution~

to some. such as

he~lth

insurance?

If employer contributions are taxed. should all contributions be taxed.
or only contributions above certain limits or caps?
Section VI offels a discussion of several

ad~itional

topics that

are important to pensions and health insurance. and that have figured
prominently in recent policy discussions:

the regulation and

restructuring of pension plans. health-care cost containmeut. retiree
health insurance, and regulation of health insurance (Section 89).

Th,~

main conclusion of this section is that we have only a sketchy
understanding of how regulation has altered the kinds of pension and
...

health insurance plans provided by employers, and of how further changes
in regulation might alter pe!lsion and health insurance plans in
desirable ways.
Section VI! briefly explores flexible benefit plans (also known as
cafeteria plans). and the issue of dependent care (child
\~hich

~are),

both of

have received much attention lately.

Section VIII discusses policy options and makes some
recommendations.

The recommendations focus on whether the tax treatment

or regulation of the two employee benefits that account for over 90
percent of all voluntary employer-provided employee benefits--pensions
and health insurance--should be changed.
regulation seems appropriate because the
toward employee benefits are:

The focus on tax treatment and
~ey

features of current policy

(a) the exclusion of employer

contributions to employee benefit plal1b (and investment earnings on
2135
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accumulated assets) from the federal personal income tax and

fr~m

payroll taxes. 1 (b) the regulation, through ERISA (the Employee
Retirement Income Security

.~ct,

as amended) and the tax code, of private

pensions, and (c) the regulation, through ERISA and the tax code, of
private health insurance rlans.
The paper also includes two appendixes.

Appendix A discusses

various data problems that have plagued those who have done research on
employee benefits,

Appendix B offers a brief review of recent studies

of the tax treatment of employee benefits.

II.

Employee Benefits:

Trends and Coverage

The growth of employee benefit:; in the years following WOl:ld War II
has caught the attention of economists and policy makers for at least
tht'ee reasons.

First. as the proportion of compensation paid as

employee benefits grew, the proportion of all compensation paid as wages
and taxed under the federal income tax declined (Chen 1981; Munnell
1984).

Second, the growth of employee benefits had implications for

employment costs, mobility, turnover, and the organization of
production--for exwnple, whether part-time and full-time workers would
be employed (Hart 1984).
growth of employee

Third, as several economists have argued, the

benef~ts

reflected

misallo~dted

resources and reduced

economic welfare, because tax subsidies for employee benefits led to
gt'eater t.han optimal provision of employee benefi ts (see, for example.
Feldstein 1977; Feldstein and Friedman 1977).
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A.

Employee Benefits in the Context of Labor Costs
It is useful to place employee benefits in the context of other

costs of employing labor. 2 Table 1 displays data on all nonwage labor
cost~

(NWLCs) as a proportion of total labor costs for U.S. private

domestic industries in 1965 (or 1966) and 1985.
into six groups:

NWLCs are broken down

payments for time not worked (row a), statutory social

welfare costs (row c), voluntary social. welfare costs (row d), benefits
in-kind (rowe), other expenses of a social nature (row f), and
vocational training (row g).

Total social welfare costs--the sum of

rows c and d--are shown in row b, and total NWLCs

a~e

shown in row h.

The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts provide data only on
statutory and voluntary welfare costs (rows b, c, and d--see the
Appendix on data problems).3
Row h of Table 1 suggests that NWLCs have grown dramatically during
the last 20 years in the t1.S.

Defining NWLCs as contributions to social

welfare plograms (see the colwnn headed "National Income and Product
Accounts"), NWLCs have grown from just under 10 percent of total labor
cost in 1966 to about 16 percent in the mid 1980s.
br~'ildly

to

includ~

Defining NWLCs more

payments for days not worked, benefits in-kind, other

soci.al expenses, and vocational training (see colwnn headed "Chamber of
Commerce"), NWLCs have grown from just under 20 percent of total labor
costs in 1965 to

~ver

27 percent in 1985.

Although row h of Table 1 shows that NWLCs as a whole have grown
significantly during the past 20 yeaI's, other rows of Table 1 reveal
tha" not all components of NWLCs have increased.

Chamber of Commerce

data not shown in Table 1 suggest that, although payments for days not
2137
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worked

~rew

as a proport.ion of total labor costs during the 1970s,

during 1.982 through 1985 they returned to roughly the
during the late 1960s (see row a).

~ame

•

level as

Benefits in-kind 3ctually fell as a

proportion of total labor costs dUling tlle 20-year period (rowe).
Other soci.al expenses grew insignificantly (row f), and vocational
training remained a minuscule proportion of total labor costs (row g).
The conclusion is that the growth of NWLCs during the 1965-1985
period can be attributed almost entirely to the growth of statutory and
voluntary employer contributions to social welfare plans (see rows c
and d).
Table 2 shows more detailed statistics on the mix of compensation
in the U.S. during 1968 through 1986.
the National Income

a~d

The statistics are derived from

Product Accounts (U.S.

Depa~tment

of Commerce

1986, 1987), and divide compensation into three parts-·wages and
salaries,

le~ally

required nonwages (mainly Social Security,

Unemployment Insurance, and Workers' Compensation, which were referred
to as statutory social welfare costs in Table 1), and voluntary nonwages
(mainly private pensions and health insurance, which were referred to as
voluntary social welfare costs in Table 1).4
The annual percentage change figures suggest that, over the past 20
years, the pattern of growth of legally required nonwages has been more
even than that of voluntary nonwagcs.
required nonwages grew (as a

pror~·tion

The data indicate that legally
of total compensation) at an

annual rate of 3.1 percent from 1968 to 1975, at an annual rate of 2.5
percent from 1975 to 1980, and at an annual rate of 1.6 percent from
1980 to 1985.

This slight deceleration of growth does mask some changes
2138
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;

within the package of statutory social welfare costs:

Contributinns to

soci.al security (OASDHI) grLw slowly during the late 1970s, but have
grown rapidly since the 1983 reIorm of the social security financing
system.

(These data are not shown in the table.)

Workers' Compensation

grew rapidly during the 1970s, only to decline as a proportion of total
labor costs in the 1980s.
table.)

..
4

(Again, tbese data are not shown in the

Nevertheless, the slowdown of the growth of statutory social

welfare costs is not dramatic.
In contrast, the growth of voluntary nonwages slowed dram3tically
and plateaued during tbe 20 year period, as can be seen in row d of
'fable 1.

The data show that voluntary nOllwages grew rapidly between

1968 and 1975--at an annual rate of 5.9 percent.

But voluntary nonwages

grew less rapidly during the late 1970s (at an annual rate of 3.1
percent).

Moreover, voluntary

no~wages

fell at an annual rete of 1.2

percent between 1980 and 1985.

B.

Disaggr~gations

by Industry

Table 3 displays NWLCs as a proportion of total labor costs in five
years, desegregated by industry.

These industry disaggregations are

based on the National Income and Product Accounts.

Each ploportion

sh<.IWTL is simply the sum of Employer Contributions to Sc)cia1 Insurance
(Accounts Table 6.12) and Other Labor Income (Table 6.13) divided by
Comp~~ •..:;... ~ i

"n (Table 6.4).

Table 3 indic4tes much interindustry variation in the incidence of
NWLCs.

Moreover, the

patte~n

of interindustry variation changed over

the 20 year period in question.

In 1966, communications and utilities
2139

I

I
,"_.

J;'

......

•

"J',," ----~:I';.

'

.

had the largest proportion of NWLCs (roughly 13 to 15.5 percent),
whereas agriculture, services, the trade sector, and construction ilad
the lowest (6 to 8 percent).
somewhat:

const~uction

By 1985, this pattern had changed

experienced an explosior. of NWLCs, and had a

proportion of NWLCs similar to manufacturing.

~lso,

NWLCs in finance,

insurance, and real estate had lost ground in relative terms, so that
the f"nancial sector had NWLCs at roug! ly the economy·wide average.
These interindustry patterns are

t~eated

further in section I.D below,

when their relationships to skill and overtime hours ale discussed.

C.

Estimates of Fixed and Variable Labor Costs
Table 4 Jisplays estimates of the percentage of t.otal labor costs

that are fixed NWLCs, and of the fixed/variable labo~ cost ratio. s A
comparison of Table 4 with Table 3 suggests that the growth of fixed
NWLCs, both in aggregate and by industry, has been similar to that of
NWLCs generally.

That is, NWLCs as a proportion of total labor cost and
•

the fixed/variable labor cost ratio both grew by 66 percent between 1966
and 1985.

Also. the growth of NWLCs in an industry is mirrored in the

growth of the fixed/variable labor cost ratio in the same industry with
only two notable

~xceptions·-construction, where

NWLCs grew by 118

percent while the fixed/variable labor cost ratio grew by 179 percent.
and wholesale trade. where NWLCs grew by 78 percent while the
fixed/variable labor cost ratio grew by 105 percent.

]
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O.

Fixed Labor Costs, Skill Levels, and Ovurtime Hours
Table 5 attempts to show the relationships between fixed labor

costs and skill levels.

The

repeats the 1985 data on

Tabl~

fixed/variable cost ratios from Table 4, and adds data on skill levels
by industry.
cons~~ption

The variable used to proxy skill ievel is real capital
allowance per full-time equivalent worker.

This variable

has been used frequently to approximate firm-specific human capital, for
the reason that it measures real capital use per worker, which in turn
is belie'V'ed to be related to the amount of firm-specific skills
possessed by

wor~ers

(Long and Scott, 1982).

The Spearman rank

correlation coefficient between the fixed/variable cost ratio and the
skill proxy is 0.88, suggesting that industries that use highly skilled
labor also face (or voluntarily take on) relatively high fixed labor
costs.
Data not presented here suggest that Zixed/variablc cost ratio is
also

r~lated

to average overtime hours in an industry (Hart and others

1988), although the relationship is weaker than that between the
fix£d/variable cost ratio and skill.

Nevertheless, the evidence

suggests that industries facing high fixed labor costs tend to make
greater use of

o~ertime,

rather than add workers to their payrolls.

In

that the relationship between fixed labor costs and skill appears
stronget that between fixed labor costs and overtime hours, the figures
accord with Hart's findings for U.K. Jrlnufacturing (Hart, 19:34, Table
2.9).

2141
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E.

Employee Benefit Coverage and Worker Charactaristics
The discussion to this point has been mute regarding how employee

~enefits

are distributed among individual workers.

Clearly. given the

public interest in retirement income and accnss to health care, it is
important to understand at a micro level the extent to which workers are
covered in employer-provided pension and health insurance plans, and
further to know the characteristics of those workers who are covered.
In addressing questions of pension and health insurance coverage.
it is possible to rely on the

M~rch

1988 Current PORulation Survey.

which includes responses to a series of questions about the inclusion of
workers in employer-proviued pension and health insurance plans.
Regarding pensions. the sU'l'"Vey questions of main interest are. "Other
than Social Security did any employor or

u~1ion

that you worked for 1n

1987 have a pension or other type of retirement plan for any of its
employees?" and "Were you included in that plan?"

Regardiug private

health insurance, the questions of interest concern whether a worker was
covered by a health insurance plan. whether that plan was in the
worker's name. whether the plan was provided through a current or former
employer or union. and whether the employer or union paid all, part, or
none of the cost of the plan.

Note that we are concerned here only

lbout a worker's ',o'('.lusioll in an employer-provided pension or health
insurance plan.

Wb'rtr.er a plan covers others in the household ard

whether a member of a household is covered by someone else's plan are
distinct issues not considet'ed liere.
Table 6 displays data on the distribution of employer-provided
pensions and health insurance &Dong workers aged 18 or older who were
2142
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not in the military and had positive earnings in 1987.

The first row of

the table shows that about 43 percent of these workers were included in
an employer-provided pension plan, whereas nearly 60 percent were
included in a group health plan.

Of tnose included in a group health

plan, about two-fifths (24.1/59.9) were in plans that were fully paid
for by the employer.

Finally. 37.5 perc3nt of these work,.:s were

covered by both pension and group health

p1an~.

Additional figures in Table 6 show that there is much variation
among workers in pension and health insurance coverage:

Female workers

are less likely to be covered than male workers; young workers are less
likely to be covered than old (except for those 65 and over); Hispanics
are less likely to be covered than other workers; workers with lower
educational attainment are less likely to be covered; nonunionized
workers are less likely to be covered than unionized workers; part-time
worker.s are less likely tu be covered than full-time workers; the
self-employe

are less likely tc be covered; and those with lower

earnings are less likely to be covered than those with higher earnings.
These coverage patterns hold for both pension and group-health
provision.
There are also sharp differences in pension and health insurance
provision among industries.

Public administration, transportation,

communications, utilities. and manufacturing all have relatively high
percentages of workers covered by both pension and group health plans.
Agriculture, services (other than professional), and retail trade have
relatively low percentages of covered workers.
relatively high

p~nsion

Industries that have

coverage also tend to have relatively high
2143
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health insurance coverage:

.......

the Spearman rank correlation coefficient

between industry pension and group health coverage is 0.96.
The variation in employee benefit coverage across occupations is
far less striking than the variation across

indu~tries.

Managers and

professional/technical workers do have relatively high coverage by
pension and group health plans.

Sales workers, service workers, and

laborers have relatively low coverage.

But the differential between the

best-covered and worst-covered occupations is far smaller than that
between the best- and worst-covered industries.
Although the means displayed in Table 6 offer a picture of the
distributional pattern of employee benefits, they provide little itlsight
into the reasons for that pattern.

For example, it is clear that female

workers are less likely than male workers to be included in
employer-provided pension or hBalth insurance plans, but it is unclear
whether this differential should be attributed purely to gender, or
whether it is partly due to the part-time/full-time stat\lS, industry of
emploYment, or occupation of women.

A rough attempt to explain the

pattern of worker coverage in pp,nsion and health insurance plans is
offered in Table 7, which displays the results of estimating four linear
probability models:

one each for inclusion in a pension plan, inclusion

in a group health insurance plan, inclusion in a group health plan that
was wholly employer-paid, and inclusion in both a pension plan and a
group health plan.
Each of the linear probability models in Table 7 is estimated by
regressing a zero-one dummy variable (for example. 1 - i.ncluded in a
pension plan; zero - excluded) on explanatory variables capturing
2144
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gender, age, ethnicity, education, union coverage, part-time/full-time

•

statuR, self-employmellt status, annual earnings, industry, occupation,
and household status.
straightforward:

The interpretation uf the coefficients is

Each shows the change in the probability of oeing

included in a benefit plan (that is, the probability that the dependent
variable equals one) associated with a unit increase in the independent
variable.
pr~bit

(Note that a maximum likelihood method such as logit or

is appropriate when, as here, the dependent variable is zero-one.

Accordingly, these estimates should be considered exploratory only.)
Consider the coefficient of the female variable in the pension
equation (0.022).

The inference is that, other things equal, female

workers are about 2 percent

~

likely to be included in an

employer-provided pension plan than are male workers.

This is somewhat

surprising in view of the large negative differential between female and
male workers in pension coverage seen in Table 6.

It appears that

variables such as part-time status, union coverage, earnings, industry,
and occupation explain much of the difference between female and male
workers in pension coverage.

(Results not displayed in Table 7 show

that the coefficient of the female variable is posi:.ive even without
controlling for industry, occupation, and household status.)
Several variables appear strongly associated with large changes in
the probability of being covered by pension and group health plans.
Workers aged 35-64 have a probability of pension coverage that is higher
by 0.13 than workers aged 18-24.

Part-time and self-employed workers

havo far lower probabilities of being covered by pension or health
itlSUrance, other things equal.

Also, the probability of benefit
2145

-.

coverage increases markedly as annual earnings increase up to $30,000.
But there is no change in the probability of benefft coverage as
earnings increase beyond $30,000.
Industry of employment is strongly related to probability of
benefit coverage.
communications,

Employment in manufacturing, transportation,

an~

public utilities, and especially in public

administration, sharply increases the probability of being covered by a
pension or group health plan.

On the other hand, occupation has a much

weaker association with the probability of benefit coverage than does
industry of employment.
A striking and surprising result shown in Table 7 pertains to union
coverage.

Although union coverage increases the probability of

inclusion in a pension plan by over 11 percent, it is unrelated to
inclusion in a health insurance plan.
Other variables are associated only weakly with the probability of
benefit coverage.

As already noted, ana surprisingly, differences

between female and male workers are quite small once other variables are
controlled for.

Finally, ethnicity and household status play only minor

roles in employee benefit coverage, according to the estimates in Table
7.
The estimates displayed in Table 7, although they provide some
insight into the reasons for employee benefit provision, tell us nothing
about whether changes have occurred in the pattern of benefit provision
over time.

Neither do they tell us why changes in the pattern of

employee benefit provision might take place.
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In futurp research, high

priority

~hould

be r,iven to analyzing

changes in the pattern of employee

III.

bOf'~

bei~fit

the existence and causes of
provision.

Explaining the Pattern of Growth of Pensions
and Health Insurance

Table 2 illustrated that voluntary nonwages, which are mainly the
costs of pensions and health insurance, grew at an annual rate of about
6 percent 1968 and 1975, at an annual rate of

l~oughly

3 percent during

the late 1970s, and actually declined at a rate of about 1 percent from
1980 through 1986.

This slowing growth of pensions and health insurance

requires an explanation.
Unfortunately, there is less certainty about the causes of ,the
pattern of growth of voluntary employee benefits than there is about the
pattern itself.

The litany of reasons for the provision of voluntary

employee benefits includes:

(a) preferential treatment under the

federal personal income tax code; (b) rising real incomes; (c) economies
of scale in the provision of pensions and health insurance

(~itchell

and

Andrews 1981): (d) efforts to improve workers' productivity and reduce
turnover by deferring payment of benefits (Logue 1979; Lazear 1961): (e)
unionization (Freeman 1981: Alpert 1982): (f) changing demographic
composition of the labor force: (g) workers' preferences and desires:
(h) capital gains and losses to pension funds resulting from changing
asset prices (Munnell 1987): and'(i) changing social norms.

[Good

general discussions of these factors include Rice (19668, 196Gb), Lester
(1967), and Long and Scott (1982)].
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To what degree can each
growth o. employee benefits?

~f

these factors explain the pattern of

Although several studies have found

evidence that unions and collective bargaining exert a positive
independent effect on the provision of nonwage benefits (Freeman 1981;
Alpert 1982; Rossiter and Taylor 1982; Fosu 1984; and Mincer 1983), the
stagnation of private-sector union growth since the 1950s makes unionism
a

rathe~

unpromising scurce of significant changes in employee benefit

provision. 6

Similarly, it is unclear that the "technologyll of benefit

provision has changed so that scale economies of benefit provision now
exist where they did not before (Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
Both theoretical and empirical work suggests strongly that deferral
of income reduces labor turnover, and by inference, improves
productivity (Logue 1979; Schiller and Weiss 1979; Lazear 1931; Wolf and
Levy 1984).

But again, it is unclear that the desire to reduce turnover

has been a driving force behind changes in the pattern of provision of
~mployee

benefits.

The only existing study of this question, by Mumy

and Manson (1985), concludes that considerations of productivity and
turnover are far less potent explanators of pension growth than is the
tax treatment of pension contributions.

Indeed, recent restructuring of

pension plans--that is, the movement away from defined-benefit plans and
toward defined-contribution plans--tends to corroborate Mumy and
Manson's findings.
The most likely causes of changes in the growth of employee
benefits, then, are the changing composition and aging of the labor
force, changes in the tax traatment of benefits, and changes in real
incomes.

Several early studies of employee benefit provision
2148
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concentrated on the growth of pensions and health insurance. since up
until 1980 growth (not slowing growth or stagnation) was the pattern
that required explanation.

In particular, most of these studies (see

Appendix B) pointed to increases in the marginal tax rate on earned
income

~s

the main explanator of employee benefit growth, and gave

ccrrespondingly short shrift to changing real

income~

and the aging of

the labor force.
The prescnt discussion will rely on a recent study by Woodbury and
Huang (1988), which attempts to separate the effects of income and
favorable tax treatment by using a pooled time-series of industry
cross-secti~ns

from the National Income and Product Accounts.

Huang and

I estimate a model of the demand for employee benefits that indicates
how responsive the employee benefit share of compensation is to changes
in the marginal tax rate on wages (that is, to the tax-price of employee
benefits), changes in real income (or real total compensation), and
other variables.

These other variables include demographic

characteristics of the workforce such as age and gender, whether the
work performed by employees was production or nonproduction, average
establishment size, the capital-labor ratio (as a proxy for
firm-specific human capital), and the annual percentage change in
output.
Two findings are central to our explanation of changes in the
employee benefit share of compensation during the 1969-1986 period.
First, in accord with the results of several earlier studies, we find
that employee benefits and wages are good substitutes for each other.
Hence, when the marginal tax rate

OIl

wages goes up, workers demand a

2149

comp~nsation

greater share of their

untaxea at the time of receipt.

as employee benefits,

wr~ ~

are

Ana second, we fiad that the demand for

employee benefits is income elastic, whereas the aemand for wages is
income inelastic.

Hence, when real incomes rise, workers demand a

greater share of their compensation as employee benefits.

This latter

finding differs from the early studies, most of which found the effects
of income on employee benefits to be small, haa difficulty separating
income effects from tax-price effects, or ignored income effects
altogether. 7
Figure 1 summarizes our findings graphically.

The line with

squares and labeled "Actual" shows the actual employee benefit share in
each year from 1970 to 1986; the line with diamonds and labeled
"Tax-Price Effect Only" shows the employee benefit share simulated by
allowing marginal tax rates to take their actual value in each year, but
holding all else constant; and the line with X's and labeled "Income
Effect Only" shows the employee benefit share simulated by alloWing real
income to take its actual value in each year, but holding all else
constant.
In addition, Figure 1 shows the predicted (or forecast) employee
benefit share (see the line with +'s and labeled "Predicted").

This

predicted share is obtained by substituting current year values of all
independent

va~iables

into our estimating equation, and solving for the

employee benefit share.

Finally, Figure 1 shows the employee benefit

share simulated by allowi.ng both marginal tax rates and real income to
take their actual values in each year, but holding all else constant

2150
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(see the line with triangles and labeled "Both Tax-Price and Income
Effects").
What we find is that changes

the tax-price of benefits relative

to wages explain about half of the change in the employee-benefit share
that occurred between 1970 and each year from 1972

throu~l

1986.

Moreover, the downturn in tlle employee benefit share that started after
1982 is predicted well by the increase in the tax-price of employee
benefits (decrease in marginal tax rates) that started after 1981.

This

increase in the tax-price of employee benefits is a clAar result of
successive revislons to the federal income tax during the 1980s that
have cut the marginal tax rate on income. s
Other variables also play an important role in explaining changes
in the employee benefit share, albeit a less important role than the
changing tax-price of benefits.
changes.

Consider, for example, real income

It is easy to see from Figure 1 that from 1977 through 1981,

falling real income damped the growth of the employee benefit share.
This suggests in turn that decreases in real

i~"ome

during the

late-1970s contributed to the slowing growth of employee benefits during
the late-1970s.

The role of the demographic variables, the

capital-labor ratio, and additional variables included in our model are
not shown in Figure 1.

Our findings suggest that these factors also

playa role in explaining changes 5n the employee benefit share, but
none plays as strong a role as either the tax-price or income
variables. 9
Our model, and simulations based on that model, suggest that
changes in two variables--the tax-price of employee benefits and real
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income--explain most of the rapid growth of employee benefits up to the
mid-1970s. the slowing growth that occurred between 1976 and 1981. and
decline that has occurred since.

The marginal tax rate on wages

~ose

(and the tax-price of employee benefits) fell throughout the 19705,
favoring provision of employee benefits.

But average real income peaked

in 1972, showed little change through 1976, and then fell through 1981.
It follows that changes in both the tax-price of employee benefits and
real income favored employee benefit growth in the early 1970s.

But

during the late-1970s. only changes in the tax-price of employee
benefits favored employee benefit growth, whereas the decline in rtlal
income damped that growth.

In the 1980s, neither changes in the

tax-price of employee benefits nor real income have favored employee
benefits--the tax-price of employee benefits has risen wich repeated
cuts in marginal tax rates, and real income growth has been modest.
Hence, the demand for ever more employee benefits has dampened, and the
actual growth of the employee benefit share has ceased.

IV.

A Framework for Evaluating Employee Benefits Policy

The discussion to this point leaves unanswered questions about what
might be the appropriate role of government policy regarding employee
benefits.
~ublic

This section sets out some possible criteria for evaluating

policy toward employee benefits. treating them under three broad

headings:

(a) static economic efficiency, (b) capital accumulation and

economic growth, and (c) equity and income distribution.
sets of criteria are considered in turn.
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These three

:

A.

•

Static Economic Efficiency
Static economic efficiency--the allocation of resourceE: to their

most highly valued usee-has been often used as an argument for taxing
employer contributions to pensions and health insurance.

Indeed, the

favorable tax treatment of employer contributions to voluntary employee
benefit plans has been under attack since at least 1973, when Martin
Feldstein argued that the exclusion of

he~lth

insurance contributions

from taxable income distorts the incentive to demand health insurance
and ultimately to use the health care system.
have followed him have made two points.
tax-favured status of health insurance is
cost of medical care:

Feldstein and those who

First. they argue that the
~espunsible

for the rising

lithe tax laws give an incentive to purchase more

heal tl'l insurance, and ... heal th insurance encourages c")nswners to
purchase more medical care than they would in the absence health
insurance" (Vogel 1980, p. 220).

Second, they have argued that a tax

subsidy for health insurance is inefficient--the government could
provide the same amount of health care directly, finance the health care
through lump-sum taxes, and have revenue left ove!' that could be
returned to taxpayers or used to buy other pUblic goods or services .10
Mark Pauly (1986) has recently challenged those who advocate taxing
health benefit contributions, arguing that the efficiency effects of
removing the tax-favored status of health insurance are ambiguous.
ambiguity arises because the health care market is so imperfect.

The
Even

in the absence of tax-subsidies, the health care sector would never be
petfectly

comp~titive.

Moreovar, there are externalities associated

with health care provision, and the market for health insurance is
2153

•

,
i
j

t
•

plagued by adverse selection.

In such a case, the theory of second best

•

•

suggests that removing a distortion may not be welfare improving.
In other words, iT., is important not to define any and 011

,
f

departures from a market-determined allocation of resources as

' ..

inefficient.

If the distribution of endowments or opportunities is

considered undesirable, if externalities in the consumption of some good
exist, or if market structure is imperfect, then the market mecllanism
may fail to achieve static efficiency.
Another factor that could offset the alleged ineificiency of giving
employee benefits favorable tax treatment is the flexibility the current
system provides employers in structuring benefit plans.
flexibilit~

may be

desi~able

This

if it leads to a more efficient allocation

of the labor force (that is, to better matches between workers and
.I

firms), or to enhancement of on-the-job effort (that is, to less
shirking).

Deferred benefits, such as pensions, have been theorized to

be an efficient mechanism for inducing worker attachment, commitment,
and the accumulation of firm-specific human capital (Lazear 1981;
Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Bell and Hart 1988.)
considerations need to be evaluated ann made
evaluation of employee-benefit

B.

pa~t

Clearly, such
of any overall

PO!~cy.

Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth
Whether a policy contributes to or inhibits capital accumulation

and long-run economic growth is a second consideration that requires
evaluation.

The criterion here is long-run efficiency, which cannot be

captured by the notion of static efficiency discussed above.
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In the context of employee benefits, questions of capital
accumulation and

~conomic

influence pensions.

growth bear mainly on policies that might

Much controversy has surrounded the question of

whether pensions result in net additions to saving, or alternatively
merely replace saving that individuals would engage in on their own if
they were not pension participants.

Pensions would result in net

additions to saving if pensions and private asset holdings were
complements, which would be the case if pension eligibility led
individuals to plan earlier and longer retirements than they otherwise
would (the additional assets would be needed to finance a longer
retirement).

Alternatively, pensions would simply substitute for

private asset holdings if pension eligibility had no impact on an
individual's retirement behavior (the pension assets would be used in
place of other

asset~

to finance a retirement of predetermined

juration).
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) have sparked similar concerns
about saving behavior:

Do (or did) lRAs simply substitute for saving

that individuals would have engaged in anyway, or do they result in net
incr~ases

in saving and private

as~et

holdings?

The issues are

important because if pensions or lRAs do generate net additional saving,
and saving in turn generates funds that are available for lending and
investment, then pensions and IRAs contributa to long-run growth.
Pozo and

~oodbury

(1986) have reviewed the evidence on whether

pensions result in net additions to asset accumulation, and offer
additional evidence using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
We find widely divergent results among the existing studies of pensions
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I.

and saving.
similar

These

~inds

div~rgent

results occur even among studies that use

of data (for example, aggregate data or household data).

In our empirical work with the 1983 SeF, we find that estimates of the
influence of pensions on private asset holdings are extremely sensitive
to changes in specification of the estimating equation.
an asset holding model that excludes current household

In particular,
ear~ings

yields

estimates suggesting that pensions and asset holdings are complements
and that households with greater pension wealth save more.

But an asset

holding model that includes current household earnings yields the
opposite result--that pensions and asset holdings are substitutes
that households with greater pension wealth save less.

~nd

The fragility of

these results suggests a need for improved data and estimating
techniques in addressing questions about the influence of pensions on
asset accumulation.
Similar controversy has surrounded the question of whether IRAs
have induced

incre~bes

or decreases in saving and asset accumulation.

Here, however, the evidence seems to support the idea that much IRA
saving has represented new saving (Venti and Wise 1987; Feenberg and
Skinner 1989).
In short. there exists much research on how pensions and various
pension policies influence saving and as£et

a~cumulation,

but consensus

has 'not yet emerged on the direction of all these influences.

The

development of data and estimating techniques to resolve convincingly
questions surrounding pensions and saving, in particular, should be
given high priority.
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C.

Equity and Income Distribution
1.

Employee Benefit

Coveras~

and Income Distribution.

As

discusned in section II above, employee benefits vaty greatly across
industries and individual workers.

But how does the pattern of employee

benefit coverage influence the distribution of income?
hAS

This question

been considered by Smeeding (1983, especially Table 6.6 and 6.7),

who finds that, as a whole, voluntary employer contributions to pensions
and to health and life insurance tend to make the distribution of income
more unequal:

High-wage workers receive a larger share of their total

compensation as deferred income and insurance than do low-wage workers.
Smeeding's findings are supported by the findings of Taylor and Wilensky
(1983) :and Chollee (1984) on health benefits, and of Andrews (1985) and
Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) on pensions.

But Smeeding also shows that it

is important to decompose nonwage compensation into health and life
insurance, on the one hand, and pensions and other deferred
compensation, on the other.
insu~ance

The reason is that health and life

benefits are roughly proportionately distributed, whereas

deferred compensation is highly regressively distributed.
Smeeding's findings

i~~icate

Specifically,

that insurance benefits increase from 3.7

percent of compensation for low-wage workers to 6.2 percent of
•

compensation for a middle-wage group, but then decline to 2.9 percent
for the highest-wage group.
0.4

p~rcent

In contrast, deferred compensation is only

of the earnings of the lowest-wage group, but 7.2 percent of

the compensation of the highest -wage gro·'p.
Legally required contributions, such as social security,
unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation, differ markedly from
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voluntary contributions in their effect on income distribution.
required contributions tend

~a

Legally

be distributed progressively, and hence

bring about greater equality.
Itl

sum, voluntarily provided employee benefits, unlike legally

mandated contr.ibutions to social insurance, seem to have a disequalizing
influence of income distribution.

This naturally raises questions about

the desirability of exempting these benefits from federal payroll and
personal income taxes.
2.

Other~ity

Considerations.

Employee benefits such as

pensions and health insurance are intended to insure workers against
income loss resulting from old age and sickness.

It is this "merit

good" aspect of employee benefits that has long been used to justify the
favorable tax treatment that employer contributions to employee benefit
plans :.:eceive.
However, if a larger proportion of the total compensation of
high-earning workers is received as nonwage benefits, as appears to be
the case, then the exemption of those benefits from payroll and personal
income taxes is clearly a regressive aspect of the U.S. tax system.
That is, exemption of nonwage benefits violates the vertical equity
precept that those with greater ability to pay for government services
should do so.
by the

This concern has been the subject of an extensive study

Congr~ssional

Budget Office (1987), which advocates reducing the

tax advantages now associated with pensions.
In addition, exemption of nonwage benefits creates situations where
horizontal inequities can--and undoubtedly do--arise.
workers, each with

to~al

compensation (wages plus contributions to
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,

Consider two

health insurance, life

insuranc~,

and pensions) of $20,000.

Suppose

also that they are both single and declare one exemption and the
zero-bracket amount.

If Mutt receives $17,000 in wages, whereas Jeff

receives $18,500 in wages, thon Jeff pays more taxes and faces a higher
marginal tax rate than Mutt.

But this clearly violates the notion of

11orizontal equity--that households equally situated should be taxed
equally.
The "pure solution" to this problem, as Munnell (1984) has called
it, is to include all employer contributions for employee benefits in
taxable gross income.

(Increases in accrued vested pension

contributions would also be included in gross income, since such

.

\}.;

increases constitute an lncrease:ln an individual's lifetime income.)
The pure solution is attractive in principle because it would mitigate
inequities in the tax system.

It is also attractive in the sense that

it would either raise federal revenues or permit federal marginal income
and payroll tax rates to be lowered.

For eYample, Munnell (1984, Table

2) estimates the revenue gain from such a comprehensive tax to be $64.3
billion.

The practical difficulties of implementing this pure solution

are minimal.

Indeed, the problems that do exist pale beside the

political opposition such a proposal would almost certainly meet.

In

view of the strong potential oppc;sition t\> taxing empL>yee benefit
contributions, some workable alternative must be sought.
One alternative that has gained currAncy, and that hEr' been
introduced in a variety of guises in legislative proposals, is to limit
the amount of the employer's contribution to both pensions and health
insurance that is excluded from the worker's taxable gross income.
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There have been numerous discussions of such proposals (Adamacl1e and
Sloan 1985; Chollet 1984; Halperill 1984; Katz and Mankiw 1985; Korczyk
1984; Steuerle and Hoffman 1979; Sullivan and Gibson 1983), and the 1986
Tax Reform did tighten limits on certain forms of retirement saving
(Congressional Budget Office 1987).

Limits on the tax advantages given

to hgalth insurance have only recently been imposed, although whether
these limits will be effective remains unclear (see the discussion of
Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code in section VI below).

It is

alleged that limiting the tax-favored status of employee benefits would
stem what many observers believe to be an inefficient and excessive use
of the health care system.

Hence, in addition to raising considerable

revenues, some believe that a "tax-cap" on health benefit contributions
would help cocrect a distortion of the price system that has led to an
inflated health care sector.
The effects of these proposed policies are considered in the
following section.

V.

Effects of Changing Tax Policy on Employee Benefits

Woodbury and Huang (1989) have simulated the effects on
compensation of three alternative changes in tax policy:

(a) the 1986

tax reform; (b) treating employer contributions to health insurance as
taxable income (both a policy of taxing all health-insurance
contributions, and a policy of taxing o.lly contributions over $1,125
annually); and (c) treating all employer contributions to both pensions
and health insurance as taxable income.

These simulations are based on
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t)

\}

t")

l

a three-equation model of the provision of wages, pensions, and health
insurance.

A.

Effects of Policy Changes on Compensation
Tables 8 and 9 summarize the effects of the policy changes on

compensation.

Table 8 shows how each of the four simulated policy

changes would have altered compensation quantities (that is, real
expenditures). nominal expenditures, and shares if they had been in
gffect during 1969 through 1982.

All effects are shown in percentage

terms, averaged over the 1969-1982 period.

Pan~l

A shows the total

effects of the policy changes-·that is, the sum of the substitution,
ordinary income. and extra income effects.

Panel B isolates the

substitution effects of each policy change--that is, the effect of each
policy if only the change in tax-price implied by each were to occur
(and if money total compensation and all other determining variables
were held constant).
In contrast. Table 9 shows estimates of how each policy change would
affect compensation quantities, uominal expenditures. and shares
enacted today under the existing tax system.

if

(Note that the 1986 tax

reform is not shown in Table 9 because comparison of each policy change
is with respect to the tax system implied by the 1986 reform.)

Again,

all changes are shown in percentage terms, and Panel A shows the total
effects of each policy change, whereas Panel B shows the substitution
effects.
1.

Effects of the 1986 Tax Reform.

The simulations suggest the

following effects of the 1986 tax reform (see Table 8).
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First. and most

important, the tax reform can be expected to lead to significant
increases in the quantity, nominal expenditure, and share of
compensation taken as health insurance.

This increase in health

insurance occurs in spite of the reduced incentive to receive
compensation as health insurance that results from lower marginal tax
rates on wages (that is, in spite of a negative substitution effect).
~he

increase in health insurance is attributable to the large

incom~

gffects of the tax reform ..
Second, the tax reform can be expected to significantly increase
the quantity of compensation received as wages.

The increase in wage

quantities is expected in light of the reduced tax-price of wages
implied by lower margi.nal tax rates.

(Note that the .share of

compensation received as wages will be little affected by the tax reform
due to the relatively larger increase in health insurance compensation).
Third, the 1986 tax reform will shift the mix of compensation away
from pensions and toward health insurance.
The basic predictions from the simulations are that the reform will
(a) increase the quantity, nominal expenditure, and share of
compensation taken as llealth insurance, and (b) shift the mix of
compensation away from pensions and toward health insurance.
predictions can be explained ·c·y noting two points.

These

First, the demand

for health insurance contributions is very inelastic, or unresponsive to
changes in tax-prices.

Hence. raising the tax-price of health insurance

will increase the share of compensation demanded as health insurance.
Second, workers are very willing to substitc.te back and forth between
pensions and wages.

That is, the demand for pensions is highly elastic,
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or responsive to changes in tax-prices.

It follows that

raisin~

the

tax-price of pensions will reduce the share of compensation demanded as
pension compensation.
The results of simulating the 1986 tax reform are troubling because
they suggest that it will be difficult to bring down health insurance
expenditures or the hoalth insurance share of cOlupensation.

Indeed,

because the 1986 tax reform has such large income effects, it will
increase the demand for health insurance even though it has reduced the
tax-price incentives to demand health insurance.

Some of this increase

may already be reflected in large increases in health-insurance premiums
that were reported for 1989 and are being reported for 1990.
2.

Effects,of Taxi.ng Health Insurance Contributions.

The

simulations suggest that treating all llealth insurance contributions as
taxable income would have a strong effect on the provision of health
insurance by employers.

Taxin~

health insurance during the 1969-1982

period would have reduced the quantity of employer-provided health
insurance by over 22 percent (Table 8), and taxing health insurance
under the currerlt system could be expected to reduce the quantity of
employer-provided health insurance by nearly 15 percent.
Similarly, taxing health-insurance contributions itl excess of
$1,125 annually (in 1982 dollars) would substantially reduce the
quantity of employer-provided health insurance.

Such a policy during

the 1969-1982 period would have reduced the quantity of health insurance
by nearly 14 percent (Table 8), and doing so under the current tax
system would red\\ce the quantity of health insurance by nearly 9 percent
(Table 9).
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An apparent side effect of taxing health insurance contributions
would be a reduction in tbe quantities of wages and pension provided by
employers.

These docreases result because t.axing health insurance would

reduce real incomes, which would lead in turn to reductions in both
wages and pensions.

Although noitller reduction would be enormous, the

decreas' in pension provision should be considered in any public
discussion of the merits of taxing health insurance, and ways of
offsetting the decrease might be considered if it were viewed as
undesirable.
3.

Effects of Taxing All Employee-Benefit Contributions.

Our

simulations imply that treating all employer contributions to pensions
and health insurance as taxable income

w~uld

dramatically reduce tlle

provision of both pensions and health insurance.

Indeed, taxing all

employee benefits would have cut pension provision by 64 percent during
the 1969-1982

peri~d,

current tax system.

and would cut pensions nearly in half under the
Health insurance would have been reduced by nearly

28 percent during the 1969-1982 period, and would be reduced by 20
percent under the current sYGtem.

These results suggest that reforming

the tax system to include employer contributions as taxable income would
be politically difficult, and could create strong pressure to increase
Social Security benefits to compensate for the decline in private
pensions.
Wage quantities would also fall (but far less dIan pensions or
health insurance) if all employee benefits were taxed.

This small

decrease results because taxing all employee benefits would reduce real
disposable incomes, which would lead in turn to reduced wage quantities.

216/.

Another effect of taxing

~ll

employee benefits wou' d be a major

shift in the mix of compensation away from pensions and health insurance
and toward wages.
b~ ~.~st

The share of compensation Leceived as pensions would

affected-·our simulations suggest a decrease in the pensions

share of nearly 40 percent.
Pensions would be reduced by half if all employee benefits were
taxed, but health insurance would be cut by only 20 percent, for a
simple reason:

Pensions and wages are far better substitutes than are

health insurance and wages.

It follows that when pensions are taxed,

workers are readily willing to substitute wages for pensions, but less
willing to substitute wages for health insurance.

B.

Distributional Effects of the Policy Changes
The distributional effects of the tax-policy changes can be seen in

t¥10 ways.

Table 10 shows the effect of each policy change on the tax

bill of the average worker in low-wage, medium-wage, and high-wage
industries.

Table 11 disaggregates the total effects of each policy

change on compensation quantities into effects on workers in low-wage,
medium-wage, and high-wage industries.
The simulations suggest that the effects of the 1986 tax reform are
roughly proportional:

Both the revenue effects and the effects of the

reform on compensation appear to be similar across industries.
Similarly, the distributional effects of taxing all health
insurance contributions are not dramatic.

Workers in low-wage

industries would experience somewhat smaller decreases in wages and
health insurance than workers in high-wage industries.
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Also, workers ill

•

I

high-wage industries would experience somewhat
income tax bills.
al·~

laq~er

increases

:1.11

their

But the differences among the thl"ee groups of workers

not great.
In contrast, the distributional effects: of taxing health insurance

contributions over $1,125 are significant.

Under the low tax cap,

workers in high-wage industries would experience a 28 percent dAcrease
in health insurance, whereas workers in low- and medium-wage industries
would experience a decrease of only 11 to 13 percent.
taxes of workers

itl

Also, the income

high-wage industries would rise by over 4 percent,

whereas the income taxes of other workers would rise by less than 1
percent.

We conclude that a low tax cap on health insurance has

distributional effects that would increase \ncome equality.
Similarly, the simulations suggest that taxing all health insurance
contributions would tend to increase income equality.

Workers in

low-wage industries wculd experience income tax increases of 14 to 15
percent, whereas workers in high-wage industries would experience tax
increases of nearly 26 percent.

VI.

Further Issues in Pensions and Health Insurance

The discussion of public policy as it bears on employee benefits
has to this point focused on the tax treatment of pensions and health
insurance.

In

thi~

section, we turn to a variety of additional issues

that are specific to pensions and health insurance, and that are of
increasing concern to workers. employers, and the public generally:

the

regulation of pensions and its impacts; the problem of health-care cost

containmentj the problems posed by health insurance plans that extend to
retired employees; and the regulation of health insurance plans under
Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code.

A.

Pension Regulation and the Restructuring of Pension Plans
Congress appears to have had two purposes in legislating the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974··ERISA.
to improve the

informati~n

The first was

available to employees about their pensions

"by requiring the disclosure and reporting ... of financial and other
information" about retirement plans (Public Law 93·406, 88 Stat' l
September 2, 1974).
The second purpose of ERISA was to improve the "equitable character
and soundness" of existing and future retirement benefit plans "by
requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with
significant service, to me~t minimum standards of funding, and by
requiring plan termination insurance."

In other words, the second goal

was to provide better benefits for more workers, and to guarantee that
anticipated benefits would in fact be received.
To bring about these ends ERISA established standards that must be
met in order for a defined-benefit pension plan to qualify for favorable
tax treatment.

These standards pertain to participation, vesting,

reporting and disclosure, and funding.

Because compliance with these

ERISA standards is costly to employers, there was discussion from the
start that ERISA might lead to termination of pension plans.

This

would, of course, frustrate achievement of broader coverage and imply
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the perverse effect of reduced coverage and lowered benefits for some
workers (Ture 1976; Stein 1980).
It was quickly noted by others, however, that plan termination was
nut the only option available to

employe~s

who faced increased costs of

definedmbenefit pension plans as a result of ERISA.

Although

termination is surely an option, employers could also convert (partly or
wholly) from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution plan, thereby
avoiding the insurance, reporting, and disclosure costs of maintaining a
plan covered by ERISA (Denzau and Hardin 1983).

Indeed, the movement

from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans--the so-called
restructuring of pensions plans--nas received increasing attention from
pension vractioners (see below).
From a social standpoint, it seems clear that the key variables of
interest are the contributions made by employers to pension plans
(whether defined-benefit or defined-contributioll) and the benefits
received by retirees.
in these outcomes.

Plan restructuring should ultimately be reflected

Taking this view, it is fairly straightforward to

show that the impact of ERISA on all employer contributions to pension
plans is ambiguous in theory--ERISA's impact may be either positive or
negative (Woodbury 1984).

Accordingly, the impact of ERISA is really an

empirical issue that must be settled by analysis of available data.
It is somewhat disturbing that

the~e

has been very little empirical

research on the effects of ERISA--that 1s, little work that attempts to
isolate the impact of ERISA apart from the many other forces that act to
alter the employer-provision of pensions.

Moreover, the research that

does exist is highly mixed--some of it suggests that ERISA's impact on
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pension contributions have been negative, others suggest small to
nonexistent impacts, and still others suggest a positive impact of
ERISA.
For example, an early study by Long and Scott (1982) suggested no
•

effect of ERISA on pension contributiol\S.

But a later study (Woodbury

1984) found that ERISA may have been responsible for as much as a
one-percentage-point increase in the share of compensation received as
pensi~ns

in the years immediately following its enact.ment.

This would

translate into a nearly 25 percent increase in pension contributions as
a result of ERISA.

Yet another study (Sloan and Adamache 1986)

concluded that ERISA significantly reduced the growth of pension
contributions in the years following its enactment.

It seems clear that

high priority should be gi.ven to establishing more convincing evidence
about whether and how ERISA has affected total employer contributions to
pensions.
At least two other studies have
other outcomes.

examin~d

Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad (1989) find that ERISA

has had no discernab1e effect on inv9luntary
firms--th~t

the impact of ERISA on

se~arations

from

is, firms are no more or less likely than before ERISA to

renege on their promises to pay pension benefits by terminatil\g workers.
Ippolito (1988) presents evidence. that ERISA has had virtually none of
the effects that might be expected on wages or employment, and failed to
induce underfunded plans to increase their funding levels.

But he also

finds that ERISA has slightly increased the rate of defined-benefit pla.n
terminations, and has increased the likelihood that newly-created
pensions plans would be dptined-contribution plans.
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Recently, much attention has been focused
pension plans--that is, on the

m~vement

011

the "restructuring" of

away from defined-benefit and

toward defined-contribution plans (Employee Benefits Research Institute
1989b).

In recent years, restructuring has permitted many firms to

recover the assets of

defined-ben~fit pension

plans that were

actuarially overfunded, as well as to avoid the costs' of cOlnpliance with
ERISA by moving to a defined-contribution plan.

Hence, corporate

financial considerati,ns (such as the availability of funds for
investment and the attractiveness of a company as a takeover target)
have come to dominate decisions about pension plan restructuring.

It is

clear, then, that competing interests have increasingly come into play
regarding decisions about how to structure pensions.
view of

wo~kers,

From the point of

the contributions made by employers to pension plans

(whether defined-benefit or defined· contribution) and the benefits they
receiv£ in retirement are of paramount interest.

But companies have

other goals that may conflict with workers' interests.

Policies that

effectively balance these competing interests are difficult to make,
given the paucity of knowledge about the impacts of current policy and
of restructuring itself.

Again, research on hOT' current policy and

restructuring activities have affected pension contributions and
expected pension benefits is much needed.

B.

Health-Care Cost Containment
Between 1982 and 1987, the cost of health insurance grew by '71

percent--more rapidly than any other component of consumption.

During

the sarne period, the cost of medical care generally increased by 35.6
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percent, and the cost of all personal consumption items taken together
gr~w

by only 20.4 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce 1988, Table

7.10).
A complete discussion of the reasons for the rapid increase in the
cost of health care generally-.and of health insurance in particular·.is
well beyond the scope of this paper.
inc~eases

Most observers attribute the

to a constellation of factors acting simultaneously.

On the

supply side, they point to increasingly sophisticated technology and a
market structure that is highly imperfect and lacking in competition.
On the demand side, they point to infusions of funds from public
sources·-mainly Medicare in recent years·-as well as privace sources.
With respect to the increasing cost of health insurance in particular,
they have pointed to health providers' practice of shifting costs to
private health· insurance carriers as Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements have become less generous.
covered the cost of providing health

car~

In effect, hospitals have
to uninsured and underinsured

patients by charging higher rates to patients who are covered by private
health insurance.
Employers have tried to stem the inflation of health-insurance
premiums in several ways (see, for
Institute 1989a).

exam~le,

Employee Benefits Research

First, they have shifted the cost of health insurance

and health care to their employees by various means:

requiring workers

to contribute to the monthly premiums paid by the employer, initiating
or increasing the deductible paid by the worker before the insurance
pays, or initiating or increasing the ccpayment (payment by the worker)
for each service received.

Second, employers have made
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increa~ing

use

of so-called utilization review, under which the appropriateness of
treatment is reviewed before treatment is administered.

Utili~ation

review includes precertification for length of stay in the hospital and
second opinions before performanco of surgery.

Third, they have moved

away from traditional fee-for-service health insurance and toward Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs).

Under HMOs, payments to health-care providers are based on a

diagnosis or on a fixed packuge of services.

Under PPOs, fee schedules

are negotiated with a limited group of health-care providers, and
utilization reviews occur in order to manage the cost of health-care
provision.
There appears to be little research on how well the various
strategies of health-care cost containment have worked, although the
obvious judgement based on the recent record of dramatic increases in
health-insurance premiums and health-care costs must be negative.
result,

i~

is not

surprisi~g

As a

that at least two of the country's largest

employers--Ford Motor and Chrysler Corporation.-have called for national
health care financed by the federal government.

Neither is it

surprising that in discussions of health-care policy within the State of
Michigan, the big three auto manufacturers have favored adoption by the
State of policies that would remove the burden of paying for apparently
ever-increasing health insurance costs, such as a comprehensive
state-financed health insurance plan.
Charitably, one might say that health-care policy in the U.S. is
currently in a state of flux.
in turmoil.

More realistically, one might say it is

How or whether the debate will resolve itself sefms a
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matter of speculation.

In two other sections of this paper, I argue

that taxing employer contributions to health insurance as taxable income
to workers would be a sensible approach to improvement of the health
care system.

It would be unrealistic to suppose that taxing health

insurance would solve all the current problems facing the health-care
sector·-it would not address the problem of uninsured individuals or the
apparently resulting problem of health-care providers shifting costs to
privately insured patients.

But in the context of a discussion of

employee benefits, it would seem to be the appropriate suggestion.
Other possible strategies, such as a system of comprehensive national
health care, go well beyond the bounds of this discussion.

C.

Health Insurance Benefits for Retirees
In addition to facing an ever-rising cost of health

inS'lrar.~e

for

current employees, employers who extend health insurance to their
retired workers face the
retirees.

~roblem

of financing health insurance for those

U.S. Department of Labor statistics indicate that over

three-quarters of full-time workers who are covered by the health
insurance plans of medium and large firms (private sector) have health
insurance coverage after retirement (U.S. Department of Labor 1987,
Table 29).
In general, employer-provided health insurance benefits for retired
workers are the same as for current workers, although health insurance
plans for retirees are usually integrated with Medicare.

Integration

with Medicare reduces the cost to employers of providing health
insurance to retirees, but the existence of retiree health insurance in
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che context of rising health insuranr.e costs
problem for firms nevertheless.

POSQS

a potentially serious

Specifically, retiree health benefits

have been financed by companies on a pay·as-you-go basis, which suggests
that as the population ages, their existence will impose an increasing
burden.

A recent Employee Benefits Research

~nstitute

report estimates

that the total unfunded liability of private employers for the future
health insurance benefits of their workers (both current and retired) is
$68.2 billion (Employee Benefits Research Institute 1988a, Table 12).
The Financial Accounting Standards Board has drafted rules under which
companies would be required to treat the cost of health insurance
promised to 'Cetirees (that is, the present value of the health-insurance
costs that workers will incur in retirement) as a liability in their
balance sheets.

It is expected that these rules will be finalized in

1990 (Employee Benefits Research Institute 1988a).

D.

Regulation of Health Insurance:

Section 89 and State Laws

An initially little-known part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was
Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The purpose of Section 89 was

to ensure that employee-benefit plans that receive tax-favored
treatment--in particular health and life insurance--would not favor
highly paid employees either in their coverage or generosity.

Section

89 attempts to achieve this goa:. of nondiscrimination by setting out
criteria that a benefit plan must meet in order to qualify for favorable
tax treatment

(see

Employee Benefits Research Institute 1989c. pp.

16-17, for a synopsis).

If a plan fails to meet these criteria, then
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the doll.ar value of benefits provider! to workers under the plan is
treated as taxable income to the worker.
Although few question the intent of Section 89, both labor and
business have attacked Section 89 as originally adopted.

Labor's fear

is that Section 89 is a first step toward taxing all employee benefits.
Business's objections cent:er on the costs assccj.ated with demonstrating
compliance--according to many employers, the original Section 89 placed
unreasonable record-keeping and data-collection burdens (Stout 1989;
LaForce 1989).

Indeed. at the time of' wri.ting, the Treasury Depart.ment

has agreed, and the House Ways and Means Committee has moved to ease
Sbction 89 so that criteria for compliance focus on whether a plan is
designed to be nondiscriminatory. rather than on whether a 'plan as used
is nondiflcriminatory (Birnbaum 1989).
The effective date for Section 89, initially January 1, 1989, was
delayed to July 1, 1989 even before the proposed easing of the rules.
It now appears that a revised Section 89 will become effective October
1. 1989.

What the actual effect of the modified Section 89 will be is

an important but difficult topic for futuro research--difficult because
accurate data on plan characteristics and availability are so scarce.
In addition to Section 89. many employers have faced an increasing
number of state laws that mandate the provision of particular types of
health insurance benefits (Stipp 1988).

Further, both Hawaii and

Massachusetts have both adopted legislation that effectively mandates
the provision of a relatively comprehensive package of health insurance
benefits to most workers (Goddeeris 1989).

Readers are referred to one

of the otheL Commission reports (Mitchell 1989) for a full treatment of
mandated benefits.

VII.

A.

Flexible Benefit Plans and New Employee Benefits

Flexible Benefit Plans
Tradi.tionally, employers have offered all workers within a given

classification a fixed package of benefits.
consisted

~f

Often those benefits have

a certain number of paid holiday, vacation, and leave days,

a pension plan, health insurance, and life insurance.

Flexible benefit

plans--often called "cafeteria" plans--differ from this traditional
arrangement in that they allow wOLkers to select from a menu of possible
benefits those benefits that they most prefer (Employee Benefits
Research Institute 1985, Chapter 28).
Two advantages have been attributed to flexible

benefi~

plans.

First, they may increase the value to some workers of the benefits that
are provided by the employer in tax-favored form.

Second, they may

induce workers to become more aware of, and to gain a better
understanding of, the benefits they receive.
To a researcher, perhaps the most striking aspect of flexible
benefit plans is that they have been so frequently mentioned in the
press and in practical discussions of employee benefits, but that there
exists virtually no substantive research or analysis of their use or
effects.

There can be little doubt tllat lack of data on flexible

benefit plans is an important reason for this gap in research on
employee benefits.
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Despite the lack cf existing research, two points about flexible
benefit plans can be made.

First, it has been noted frequently that the

existence of flexible benefit plans may lead to adverse selection-·that
is, to workers who are good risks (from the. point of view of health
insurance or life insurance, for example) opting out of a plan, leaving
only bad risks.

Models of adverse selection suggest that when good

risks opt out of an insurance market, insurance premiums increase and
ultimately the insurance market in question fails.

The only way to

mitigate adverse selection in the context of flexible benefit plans is
to limit flexibility, for example, by placing insurance plans outside
the basket of benefits among which workers may choose.

But tllis thwarts

the basic idea of the flexible benefit plan.
The second point has to do with flexible benefits in the context of
public policy.

A central problem in the concept of flexible benefit

plans is that flexible benefits thwart the ability of policy makers to
encourage provision and use of particular benefits.

Illstead, by

designating a broad array of benefits as tax-favored, flexible benefit
plans encourage provision and use of a rather arbitrary package of
benefits.

In short, the flexibility inherent in flexible benefit plans

robs policy makers of the ability

t~

direct resources toward particular

benefits, directing them instead toward a grab-bag of activities and
benefits.
There is likely to be disagreement about whether these two
disadvantages of flexible plans outweigh their advantages.

But to the

extent that flexible benefit plans undermine the basic insuranco
principles of certain employee benefits, and erode the ability of public
2177

policy makers to achieve desired goals, they would seem to be a
deleterious innovation in employee benefits.

B.

D~pendent

Care

The dramatic influx of

especially married women··into

womon~·and

the labor force since World War II has led to increasing attention being
given to "the interaction of work and the family" (Norwood 1988).

Ir.

particular, the availability of child care (or more generally dependent
care) has 'oeen an increasing concern in

Q

labor market in which women

with young children make up a substantial proportion of all workers.
At least four other Commission papers are devoted to one or another
aspect of dependent care (Friedman 1989a, 1989b; Staines 1989; Rodgers
and Rodgers 1989).

Accordingly, it is necessary here only to point to

some of the issues that are of special concern in the context of
employee benefits.

For example, Norwood (1988) has discussed the

problems that the provision or child care and other nontraditional
benefits raise for the measurement of total compensation.

Hayghe (1988)

reports the results of a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics special
survey, which shows that only about 5 percent of all establishments with
10 or more employees provide direct child care benefits (that is, day
care or financial assistance).

Moreover, "only 2 percent of the 442,000

establislunents that reported no child care benefits or flexible
work-schedule policies said they were 'considerixlg' doing something in
the future" (Hayghe 1988, pp. 42-43).

Finally, Robins (1988) provides a

survey of the existing federal programs that suppvrt or encourage child
care.
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VIII.

Implications for Public Policy

A multitude of public policy issues currently surround the tax
treatment of employee benefits.

In particular, the tax-favored

stat~s

of employer contributions to pensions and health insurance has been
blamed for numerous ills:

a shrinking tax base that has exacerbated the

federal budget deficit; an inefficient and bloated health-care sector,
overinsurance by many recipients of employer-provided health insurance,
and rising health-care costs; and a tax system that is made more
regressive because those who receive tax-favored employee benefits tend
to be in higher-income households than those who do not.
In addition to being held responsible for these perceived ills, the
tax-favored status of employee benefits is implicitly blamed for failing
to solve completely the problems one woul.d expect it to address.

Why do

many workers still lack coverage by private pension or health insurance
plans?

Why, if tax-favored treatment of pension contributions is

responsible for the growth of private pensions, is the rate of private
saving in the U.S. nevertheless so low by international standards?

A.

Some Options
Policies suggested to deal with these perceived problems have often

3ddressed one problem without handling another.

Two such proposals are

taxing all employer contributions to pensions and health insurance, and
requiring employers to provide some minimum level of health insurance to
all employees--mandated health benefits.
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We discuss each in turn.

1.

Ta';Sin& All Employee Benefit Contributions.

The simulations

suggest that the taxation of all employee benefits is too sweeping a
policy change to implement in the foreseeable future--taxing all
employer contributions would cut in half employEr contributions to
private pension plans.

.

Perhaps the simplest implication of this finding

is that a policy of taxing all employee benefits would be politically
difficult to implement.
Even if it were not a politically difficult option, the simulations
suggest that taxing all benefits would dramatically reduce retirement
saving through the private pension system, and it is unclear that this
would be desirable.

First, the U.S. economy has a low rate of private

saving by international standards, and a policy that would further
reduce private saving would be counter to the goal of long-run economic
gro~th.

Second, taxing all benefits would, by cutting in half the size

of private pension contributions, place on the public retirement system
an increased long-run burden.

If policybmakers wish to tax pension

contributions, they must in turn be willing either to increase the size
of the OAS! system, or to see the income replacement rates of retirees
fall substantially.

Neither of these alternative seems desirable or

easy to defend.
In short, because its effects of the private pension system appear
to be so dramatic, the policy of taxing all employee benefits seems both
politically infeasible and economically unwise.
2.
recently

Mandated Benefits.
c~ught

The idea of mandating health benefits has

the attention of the public and many policy Dlakers.

A

full traatment of mandated health benefits is beyond the scope of this
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discussion, in view of the Commission report by Mitchell (1989) on this
topic.

Nevertheless, three points may be appropriate.

First,

discussions of mandated benefits often seem to imply that mandating
would do away with the problem of uninsured individuals, when of course
mandating would only do away with the problem of uninsured workers.
other words, some advocates 01

I..

In

·ndated health insurance have not

clearly specified the nature of problem posed by the uninsured.

Neither

have they clearly delineated who would and who would not benefit from
mandated benefits.

It follows that the degrp.e to which mandating would

be an efficient way of solving the social problem posed by

uninsur~d

individuals is largely an unanswered question.
Second, the effects of mandated benefits on labor markets,
especially low-wage labor markets, have yet to be examined in any
systematic way.

It seems likely tliat mandated benefits could have the

same adverse effects on employment of low-wage worklars as a large
increase in the minimum wage, but the needed research on this question
does not exist.

Third, mandatitlg health-care benefits could contribute

to further increases in health-care costs, and further inefficient use
of the health-care system.

The reason is that, to the extent mandating

is successful in extending health insurance to currently uninsured
workers and households, it would increase use of the 11ealth-care system.
In part, such an increase would be desirable, but (depending on the
package of benefits mandated) it is also possible that further overuse
of health servir.es would result.
The case for mandating health-insurance benefits seems far from
clear-cut at this time.

Too little research, either theoretical or
2181
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empirical, has been conducted to offer a well-reasoned judgement.

What

is clear is that mandating benefits, like the favorable tax treatment of
health insurance contributions, may create its own set of problems
without providing a complete solution to thQ problems it is intended to
address.

B.

A Proposal for Marginal Change
A relatively low cap on health-insurance contributions appears to

be a sensible and efficiency-improving policy.

A policy of taxing

employer contributions to health insurance in excess of a relatively low
amouIlt ($1,125 annually, for example, as discussed above) has at least
five points in its favor.
First, it partially addresses the problems of rising health-care
costs, overuse of the health-care system, and an inefficiently large
health-care sector.

It does so by reducing the incentive for employers

to provide compensation in the form of health insurance beyond a given
level.

As a result, the health insurance provided by employers would be

more likely to be true insurance against large and unexpected health
expenses, and less likely to be a simple tax subsidy to consumption of
health-care services that are regular and predictable.
Second, a low tax cap on health insurance addresses the concern
that the tax base will continue to be eroded as health-care costs rise,
and as employer contributions to health insurance increase.

Many

predictions suggest that employer contributions to health insurance will
continue to rise in real terms.

By limiting the extent to which
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employer contributions to

heal~h

insurance are excluded from the tax

base, erosion of the tax base 1s halted.
Third, a low tax cap on health insurance would

~

limit or reduce

the access to basic health care by any currently insured or potentially
insurable worker.

It would likely reduce the degree to which workers

who are currently overinsured consume health-care services.

That is, it

would tend to reduce the provision by employers of insurance that covers
regular and predictable health care (Phelps 1984-85),

But again, the

low tax cap would be unlikely to reduce workers' coverage by
employer-provided major medical insurance.
F~urth,

in reducing the provision of health

insuranc~

for regular

and predictable health care, the low tax cap would imply an improvement
in the equity of the tax system.

The simulations discussed above

suggest strongly that a low tax cap on health-insurance contributions
would have a favorable distributional impact.

Because workers who have

the highest total compensation tend to be covered by the most generous
employer-provided health insurance, taxing health contributions over a
specified maximum would be a progressive tax measure.
Fifth, a low tax cap on health insurance contributions would

n~t

foreclose the option of mandating health insurance benefits, should
policy-makers choose to pursue mandating.

If all health insurance

contributions were taxed, it would be extremely awkward to mandate
health-insurance coverage because'the two policies would tend to work at
cross purposes.

Taxing benefits above the mandated level would not pose

this problem, however.

Essentially, a policy of mandating

~

taxation

of benefits over a specified level could be viewed as a statement of
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what level of health-insurance benefits is in the public interest.

But

again. the case for mandating health insurance is not clear-cut at
present.
In short. a low t.ax cap on health insurance contributions would
tend to alleviate each of
exacerbating other

th~

probl~ms

perceived prvblems outlined above witbout

or foreclosing other policy options.

Accordingly. the low tax cap seems a sensible and economically sound
policy. the adoption of which should be urged.
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Table 1
Non-Wage Labor Costs (NWLCs) as a Proportion of Total Labor Costs
by Type of Cost, U.S. Private Domestic Industries 1965-1985

National Income
Product Accoun~
1966
~
a
a

~

Type of IDil&
(a) Payments for time
not worked
Total social welfare
costs

Chamber of
Commerce
1985
1965
0.0842
0.0762

0.0961

0.1600

0.1026

0.1697

(c) Statutory social
welfare costs

0.0493

0.0780

0.0448

0.0786

Voluntary social
welfare costs

0.0468

0.0820

0.0578

0.0911

(e) Benefits in-kind

a

a

0.0040

0.0015

(f) Other expenses of
a social nature

a

a

0.0145

0.0163

(g) Vocational Training

a

a

0.0008

0.0021

0.1600

0.1981

0.2738

(b)

(d)

(h)

Total NWLCs

0.0961

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
The National Income and Produ~ Accounts of th§ United Stnte~ 1929-82:
Statisti.cal Tables (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986); Survey of
Current »usiness 66(July 1986); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Employee
Benefits, various years.
a. The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts do not report the
following as separate cost items: payments for time not worked, inkind benefits, other expenses of a social nature, and vocational
training. Payments for time not worked and benefits in-kind are
included as direct wage and salary payments. Other expenses of a
social nature and vocational training appear to have no counterpart in
the Accounts.
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TABLE

2

Total Compensation in Current Dollars and
the Distribution of Compensation by Type,

1968-1986
Percentage of
Total Compensation Paid

-Year
N
....
00

0'

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

56

Total
Compensation
Jcurrent dollars)

Wages
and
Salaries

Legally
Required
Nonwages

416,430
459,252
485,346
514,323
567,862
640,287
702,731
738,842
829,984
930,471
1,060,682
1,200,078
1,315,139
1,451,580
1.521.944
1.609.958
1.775,291
1,899,965
2,006,269

90.1
89.9
89.5
89.0
88.2
87.e;
87.1
86.4
85.6
85.1
84.8
84.7
84.5
84.5
84.1
84.0
84.1
8L~. 3
84.4

5.0
5.1
5.0
5.1
5.5
6.2
6.3
6.2
6.5
6.7
6.9
7.1
7.0
7.2
7.2
7.4
7.7
7.7
7.7

Average Annual Rate of Change
in Percentage Paid as:

8S:

Wages
Voluntary
Nonwages

4.9
5.1
5.5
5.9
6.3
6.4
6.6
7.3
7.8
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.5
8.3
8. '/
8.6
8.2
7.9
7.9

Salaries

Legally
Required
Nonwages

-0.60

3.1

and

percent

1

J

I

-0 .41~

per-cent

2.5

Voluntary
Nonwages

5.9

percent

3.1

percent

percent

percent

-0.02

1.6

percent

percent

-1.2

percent

...

Notes: All data are derived from the National Income and Product Accounts: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States,
1929-82, Washington, D.C., u.s.a.p.o., September 1986: Survey of Current Business 67 (July 1987), and
unpublished two-digit industry detail underlying the published figures. The unpublished data were
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table references below are to the published sources.

N
....
00

'"

Total Compensation is total expenditure of private domestic industries on employee compensation,
excluding directors' fees. (Table 6.4B of the published data include directors' fees in Total
Compensation.) Wages and Salaries are from Table 6.58. Legally Required Nonwages are the sum of
Employer Contributions for Social Insurance (Table 6.12) and privately administered Workers'
Compensation (Table 6.13). Hence, Legally Required Nonwnges include all private do~estic contributions
for Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Hospital Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, Workers'
Compensation, and Temporary Disability Insurance. Voluntary Nonwages are Other Labor Income (Table
6.13) less privately administered Workers' Compensation and dir.ectol's' fees (Table 6.13). Hence,
Voluntary Nonwages inclUde all private domestic contributions for pensions, profit sharing, group health
and lire insurance, and supplemental unemployment benefits.
Because Table 6.13 does not report Other Labor Income by type for private domestic industries, we
have used unpublished data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to compute Workers' Compensation
contributions and directors' fees for domestic private industries.
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Table 3
Non-Wage Labor Costs as a Proportion of Total Labor Costs
by Industry, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1985:

U.S. National Income and Product Accounts Data

Industry

1966

1971

llli

1981

1985

All Private
domestic

0.0961

0.1113

0.1444

0.1563

0.1600

Agriculture

0.0602

0.0744

0.1027

0.1338

0.1321

Mining

0.1229

0.1345

0.1618

0.1674

0.1713

Construction

0.0817

0.0907

0.1364

0.1590

0.1787

Manufacturing:
Durable
Nondurable

0.1150
0.1092

0.1391
0.1222

0.1768
0.1577

0.1890
0.1822

0.1887
0.1830

Transportation

0.1016

0.1170

0.1644

0.1654

0.1862

Communications

0.1566

0.2064

0.2176

0.2214

0.2227

Utilities

0.1320

0.1500

0.2100

0.1998

0.2034

Trade:
Wholesale
Retail

0.0763
0.0755

0.0924
0.0872

0.1176
0.1107

0.1280
0.1231

0.1359
0.),337

Finance and
Insurance

0.1100

0.1240

0.1647

0.1593

0.1587

Services

0.0639

0.0775

0.1051

0.1205

0.1275
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Table 4
Estimates of Fixed and Variable Labor Costs in the U.S
by Industry, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1985:
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts Data

Industry

1966

1971

1976

llll

All Private
domestic

6.01

6.54

8.90

9.28

9.59

Agrio:·..l ture

2.99

2.88

4.96

5.47

5.57

Mining

8.8~

8.97

11.35

10.99

10.96

Construction

3.94

3.84

7.40

8.63

10.28

Manufacturing:
Durar:..::
Nondurable

7.90
7.22

9.25
7.28

12.02
9.97

12.42
11.58

12.26
11.68

Transportation

5.22

6.16

9.22

8.66

9.89

Communications

12.53

17.03

17.21

16.93

16.73

Utilities

10.23

11.58

16.41

14.49

14.61

3.88
4.16

4.93
3.89

6.4/.

5.07

6.71
5.61

7.66
6.70

Finance and
Insurance

8.14

8.84

12.29

10.99

10.80

Services

3.32

3.85

5.77

6.46

6.97

Fixed Employee
Benefits as percent
of total labor
cost:

Trade:
wholesale
Retail
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Table 5
Fixed/Variable Labor Cost Ratios and Skill Levels
in the U.S. by Industry, 1985:

u. S.
Industr~

Natj.onal Income and Product Accounts Data
Fixed/Variable
Cost Ratio

RADk

Skill
Proxy

Rink

All private
domestic

0.1061

Agriculture

0.0590

12

2.57

9

Mining

0.1231

C"
oJ

12.09

3

Construction

0.1146

7

1.63

10

Manufacturing:
Durable
NonduL'able

0.1397
0.1317

3
4

5.84
8.58

5
4

Transportation

0.1097

8

5.82

8

Conununications

0.2009

1

21.05

2

Utilities

0.1712

2

23.01

1

Trade:
Wholesale
Retail

0.0830
0.0719

9
11

2.63
1.43

8

11

Fi.nance and
Insurance

0.1211

6

3.74

7

Services

0.0749

10

1.19

12

3.82

Notes: The skill proxy is constructed from national Income and
Product Accounts data by dividing real capital consumption
allowance by full-time equivalent employment. The Spearman rank
correlation coefficient between the fixed/variable cost ratio and
the skill proxy is 0.88.
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Table 6
Inclusion of Workers in Employer-Provided Pension
and Group Health Insurance Plans: Tabulations from the
March 1988 Current Population Survey

Worker
Characteristics

Percentage
Included in
GrOllI' Health Plan
Employer
Tot.a1
Pa~A1l

Percentage
Included in
Pens i.on Plans

Percentage
Included in
Both Pens ion
and Health Plan

All workers

42.9

59.9

24.1

37.5

Gender:
Male
Female

46.0
39.3

66.0
52.5

26.7
20.9

42.2
31. 9

Age:
18-24
25-34
35-64
65 and over

17.3
41. 6
51. 7
22.5

38.3
63.8
64.5
40.3

14.1
26.1
26.0
17.4

14.2
36.8
45.2
18.0

Ethnicity:
White Nonhispanic
Hispanic
Black
Other

43.9
31. 9
44.8
44.0

61.0
49.6
60.0
58.0

25.4
17.6
18.6
22.6

38.5
27.2
39.1
36.3

26.i.

Education:
0-8 years
9-12 years
13 years and over

39.1
48.8

41.6
56.9
65.0

14.6
22.4
26.9

22.7
33.9
42.9

Union Coverage:
Covered
Not Covered

68.7
42.8

70.2
59.8

26.3
24.1

55.6
37.4

Employment Status:
Part-Time
Full-Time

16.3
48.5

23.8
67.4

9.3
27.2

10.4
43.2

Class of Workers:
Self-Employed
Not Self-Employed

7.2
46.1

18.6
63.6

9.7
25.4

4.4
40.5

13.1

24.9
66.5
79.9
85.4
84.6
84.8
81.6

8.9
25.4
33.0
36.8
36.5
35.7
39.3

8.S
36.7
56.5
66.5
67.0
65.6
58.5

Annual Earni.ngs:
$1 - $10,000
$10,001 - $20,000
~20,001 - $30,000
$30,001 - $40,000
$40,001 - $50,000
$50,001 - $60,000
$60,000 and over

l~3.

3

62.5
71.2
72.0
69.4
62.8
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Table 6
(continued)

Worker
Characteristics
Industry:
Agriculture
Mining/Construction
Durable Goods
Nondurable Goods
Transport, Communication,
and Public Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate
Business Services
Personal Services
Entertainment Services
Professional Services
Public Administration
Occupation:
Managerial
Professional/Technical
Sales
Clerical
Craft
Operatives, except
Transport
Transport Operatives
La'Dorers
Service and Other
Household Status:
Householder with
Relatives
Spouse of Householder
Other Relative of
Householder
Nonfamily Householcer
or Unrelated Individual

Notes:

Percentage
Included in
Group Health Plan
Employer
Total
Paid All

Percentage
Included in
Pension Plans

Percentage
Included in
Both Pension
and Health Plan

8.6
32.0
59.2
52.2
60.4

20.9
51.8
81.3
73.8
75.4

9.8
21. 9
35.0
26.4
31. 9

6.4
28.0
55.5
48.0
56.0

39.6
21. 9
46.1

68.7
41.5
66.5

30.6
14.8
23.8

35.3
17.7
39.7

23.1
11. 7
22.9
51. 6
81. 3

46.7
28.3
43.1
61.8
80.0

19.5
10.9
19.4
26.7
26.3

19.6
9.4
20.2
42.7
71. 3

52.1
59.8
28.0
47.7
'404.6
46.4

72.4
71. 7
49.9
62.5
35.1
64.6

30.6
·29.7
19.4
24.4
13.9
26.3

46.6
52.2
23.8
39.5
41.1
42.3

44.2
32.6
23.0

68.9
63.7
51.0

25.9
26.9
19.0

39.6
28.9
19.1

51.0

70.5

27.9

46.9

41.5
22.2

48.3
41. 7

19.1
15.4

31. 2
19.0

41.4

65.1

28.8

38.1

Sample includes workers who were not in the military, were 1.8 years or older, and
had positive earnings in 1987. There are 68,226 workers in the sample.

64
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Table 7
Linear Probability Models of
Inclusion 1n Employer-Provided
Pension and Group Health Insurance Plans

Depend~ Variables

Explanatory
Variable
Intercept:

Included in
Pension
Plan

Included in
Group Health
Plan

Included 1n
Included in
Fully-Paid Both Pension
Group Health
and Group
Plan
Health Plans

-0.043
(0.013)

0.163
(0.003)

0.085
(0.013)

-0.033
(0.013)

0.022
(0.005)

0.017
(0.004)

0.018
(0.004)

o 024
(0.004)

25 - 34

0.063
(0.006)

0.070
(0.006)

0.037
(0.006)

0.060
(0.006)

35 - 6l.

0.134
(0.006)

0.067
(0.006)

0.029
(f).006)

0.116
(0.006)

65 and over

0.077
(0.011)

0.082
(0.010)

0.049
(0.011)

0.061
(0.011)

Hispanic

-0.052
(0.006)

-0.062
(0.006)

-0.046
(0.006)

-0.053
(0.006)

Black

0.019
(0.006)

-0.005
(0.006)

-0.059
(0.006)

0.014
(0.006)

Other

-0.007
(0.009)

-0.031
(0.009)

-0.025
(0.009)

-0.028
(0.009)

Gender:
Female
Male
Age:
18 - 24

Ethnicity:
White Nonhispanic
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Table 7
(continued)

--

Explanatory
Variable

Dependent Variables
Included l.n
Included in
Fully-Paid Both Pension
Included in
Included in
Group
Health
and Group
Pension
Group Health
Plan
Plan
Health Plans
Plan

Education:
0-8 years
~

9-12 years

0.038
(0.008)

0.056
(0.007)

0.030
(0.008)

0.033
(0.008)

13 years and over

0.033
(0.008)

0.050
(0.008)

0.029
(0.008)

0.0~9

(0.008)

0.115
(0.022)

-0.006
(0.022)

-0.015
(0.022)

0.058
(0.022)

-0.078
(0.005)

-0.158
(0.005)

-0.059
(0.005)

-0.082
(0.005)

-0.271
(0.006)

-0.335
(0.006)

-0.115
(0.006)

-0.252
(0.006)

$10,001 - $20,000

0.203
(0.005)

0.288
(0.004)

0.118
(0.005)

0.186
(0.004)

$20,001 - $30,000

0.363
(0.005)

0.379
(0.005)

0.178
(0.005)

0.348
(0.005)

Union Coverage:
Covered
Not Covered
Employmant Status:
Part-Time
Full-Time
Class of Worker:
Self-Employed
Not Self-Employed
Annual Earnings:
$1 - $10,000
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Table 7
(continued)
Variables
Included in
Included in
Fully-Paid Both Pension
Group Health
Ilnd Group
Plan
Health P1anL

D~~e~dent

Explanatory
Variable

Included in
Included in
Group Health
Pension
PlatLPlan

$30,001 • $40,000

0.434
(0.007)

0.413
(0.007)

0.211
(0.007)

0.42&
(0.007)

$50,000

0.448
(0.009)

0.406
(0.009)

0.209
(0.009)

0.438
(0.009)

$50,001 - $60,000

0.435
(0.012)

0.418
(0.012)

0.205
(0.012)

0.438
(0.012)

$60,000 and over

0.394
(0.011)

0.404
(0.011)

0.247
(0.011)

0.391
(0.011)

Mining/Construction

0.015
(0.012)

0.042
(0.012)

0.018
(0.012)

0.012
(0.012)

Durable Goods

0.188
(0.012)

0.232
(0.011)

0.109
(0.012)

0.198
(0.012)

Nondurable Goods

0.167
(0.012)

0.213
(0.012)

0.050
(0.012)

0.175
(0.012)

Transport, Communication, 0.192
and Public Utilities
(0.012)

0.182
(0.012)

0.076
(0.012)

(0.012)

Wholesale Trade

0.069
(0.013)

0.174
(0.013)

0.OJ6
(0.013)

0.071
(0.013)

Retail Trade

0.049
(0.011)

0.091
(O.Olt)

0.010
(0.011)

0.049
(0.011)

Finance, Insurance,
and Re~l Estate

0.131
(0.012)

0.165
(0.012)

0.021
(0.012)

0.124
(0.012)

$40,001

b

Industry:
Agriculture

I

o
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Table 7
(continued)

Explanatory
Variah-l&

Dependent Variables
Included in
Included in
Included in
Included in
Fully-Paid Both Pension
Pension
Group Health
Group Health
and Group
Plan
Hp-a1th PlansPlan
Plan

-

Business Services

-0.020
(0.012)

0.065
(0.012)

0.023
(0.012)

-0.012
(0.012)

Personal Services

-0.007
(0.013)

0.052
(0.012)

0.007
(0.012)

0.010
(0.012)

Entertainment Services

0.037
(0.018)

0.092
(0.017)

0.047
(0.018)

0.046
(0.018)

Professional Services

0.183
(0.011)

0.160
(0.011)

0.076
(0.011)

0.153
(0.011)

Public Administration

0.386
(0.012)

0.213
(0.012)

0.016
(0.012)

0.340
(0.012)

Managerial

-0.007
(0.007)

0.052
(0.007)

0.015
(0.007)

-0.019
(0.007)

Professional/Technical

0.054
(0.007)

0.063
(0.006)

0.001
(0.007)

0.038
(0.007)

Sales

-0.037
(0.007)

0.012
(0.007)

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.045
(0.007)

Clerical

0.057
(0.006)

0.076
(0.006)

0.020
(0.006)

0.033
(0.006)

Craft

0.026
(0.007)

0.033
(0.007)

0.003
(0.007)

0.016
(0.007)

Operatives, except
Transport

0.027
(0.008)

0.061
(0.008)

0.007
(0.008)

0.016
(0.008)

Transport Operatives

0.001
(0.010)

0.016
(0.009)

0.010
(0.009)

-0.017
(0.009)

Laborers

0.040
(0.010)

0.031
(0.009)

0.003
(0.010)

0.027
(0.010)

•

Occupation:

Service and Other

8JU(""
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Table 7
(continued)

Explanatory
VarJ.able

Dependent Variables
Included in
Included in
Included in
Ir.cluded in
Fully-Paid Both Pension
Group
Health
and Group
Pension
Group Health
_
Plan
Health Plans
Plan
Plan

Household Status:
Householder with
Relatives

0.020
(0.005)

-0.005
(0.005)

-0.040
(0.005)

0.011
(0.005)

Spouse of Householder

0.020
(0.005)

-0.126
(0.005)

-0.C8l
(0.005)

-0.046
(0.005)

Other Relative of
Householder

-v.OO8
(0.006)

-0.064
(0.006)

-0.051
(0.006)

-0.020
(0.006)

R-squared (adj)

0.303

0.340

0.088

0.290

MSE

0.171

0.159

0.167

0.166

F

725.5

857.4

160.5

680.2

Nonfamily Householder
or Unrelat€Q Individual

Source:

Ordinary least squares estimates from sample of workers who were not in
military, were 18 years or older, and had positive earnings in 1987 in
the March 1988 Current Population Survey.
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Table 8
Summary of effects of Polley Changes un Fringe Benefit Provision:
Average Percentage Changes Under Tax Systems ExistIng 1969'1982

PANEL A:

TOTAL EFFECTS

PANEL B:

PolfcJL
Efffcts of 1986 Tax Reform on:
Quantities
Expenditures
Compensatfon Shares
Effects of Taxln; Health
Insurance ContributIons on:
Quantities
Expenditures
COlopensat Ion Shares
Effects of Low Tax Cap on
Health Insurance on:
Quantities
hpendftures
Compensdtlon Shares
Effects of Taxing All
Benefits on:
Quantities
Expenditures
N
Shares
Compensation
....

Wages
+9.4
+2.2
'0.3

·1.7
·0.9
+0.2

'0.4
·J.2
+0.1

'0.8
+0.8
+3.0

Pensions
+0.9
+0.8
'1.4

·5.8
·6.0
'4.7

'2.6
·2.9
·1.8

·64.1
. S1. 7
'53.9

Health
Insurence

SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS

+10.4
+10.7
+7.7

policy _
Effects of 1986 Tax Reform on:
Quantities
Expendi tures
Compensation Share.

'22.3
+0.2
+2.2

Effects of Taxing Health
Insurance Contribution. on:
QuantitIes
Expenditures
Compensation Shares

•13.9
+0.3
+0.7

Effects of Low Tax Cap on
Health Insurance on:
Quantities
Expenditures
compensation Shares

-27.9
'6.2

·2.4

Effects of Taxing All
Bene11 t8 on:
Quantities
ExpendltureG
Compensation Shares

Wagea

~ensfons

+'.6
'5.5
+0.7

•18. 5
'19.2
•13. 1

'6.1
'6.5
+0.7

+1.0
+2.1
'0.2

+2.8
+3.1
'0.6

·16.9
+7.8
+4.6

+0.7
+1.1
'0. ,

+1.6
+1.6
'0.4

." .3
+4.1
+1.8

+4.3
+6.7
+2.4

'53.9
'36.9
'46.1

'18.2
+7.6
+2.4

\0
00

71
70

Health
Insurance

"

.

Table 8
(continued)
Notes: The figures Ihow how repllcing the tex Iyatems In effect during 1969 through 1982 with the specified tax·policy changes would hive changed
compensation quantities, expenditures, end Iheres. Chenge. are Ihown In annual percentage terms, .veraged over the l' veara. "Total effect" refer. to
the sum of the substitution, ordinary income, and extra Income effects. The 8ubstltution effect Isoletes the Impact of the changing tax-price of wlge.
relative to pensions and health Insurance.
Sourc~s:

Woodbury and Huang (1989).

r:

~j
(u
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Tlble 9
Summary of Effects of Policy Changes on Fringe Benefit ProvisIons
Average Percentage Changes Under Tax Sv.tems ExIstln; 1969'1982

PANEL A:

PANEL B:

TOTAL EFFECTS

PolicY

\leges

~-

Effect. of Tlxing Health
In.urance Contributions on:
Quantitfes
expendi tures
Compensation Shares

'0.7
'0.6
+0.1

Effects of LON Tax Cap on
Health Ir ,Aanee on:
Quant Hies
Expenditures
Compensation Shares

•0.1
'0.1
+0.0

Effects of Taxing All
Benef Its on:
Quantities
Expenditures
Compensation
Shares
N

'0.4
+0.7
.2.2

N

0
0

74

..eInslons

·4.3
'4.2
'3.7

- , .7
'1.8
'1.5

'48.8
-36.9
'39.3

Health
lJ1surance

'14.7
+0.4
1.8

-8.7
+0.3
+0.4

•20.1
-4.4
·1.6

SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS

Pel Icy

'-':-

Wllges

Pensions

Heal th
Insurllnce

Effects of Taxing Health
Insurance Contributions on:
Quantftft.s
Expenditures
Compensation Shares

+0.7
+0.8
'0.1

+0.1
+0.3
'1.5

·1' .9
+4.0
+3.1

Effects of Low Tax Cap on
Health I~surance on:
Quentltles
Expenditures
Cnmpensltlon Shares

+0.4
+0.4
-0.0

+0.2
+0.3
'0.6

-7.4
+1.9
+1.0

Effects of Taxing All
Benefits on:
Quantities
Expendltur"s
Compensation Shar~s

+3.4
+4.9
+1.7

·38.~

'23.1
'33.8

-12.1
+6.4
+1.4

.

~

.

Tablt' 9
(c,:ontinued)
The figure••how how the .pecified tex·policy change. under the 1986 tax reform Nould change cc'mpensation quantities, expenditures, and ahlrel.
"Total .ffect" refer. to the tum of the lubstitution, ordinary income, and extra income effects. The substitution effect ilolates the impact of the
changing tax·price of wage. relative to pensions and henlth insurance.
~t

Sources: Woodbury and NUln; (1989).
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Table 10
Simulated Effects of Policy Changes on
Federal Personal Income Tax Revenues

_,
-=P:.::o~l:.:i.:.:::c'.,1.y----1986 Tax Reform:
Aggregate
l.ow-Wage Industry
Medium-Wage Industry
High-Wage Indust~y

Percentage Change in Revenue
Under Tax Systems
Under 1986
Tax_~eform
1969 - 1982

-21.2
-21.9
-19.8
-22.8

Taxing Health Insurance
Contributions:
Aggregate
Low-Wage Industry
Medium-Wage Industry
High-Wage Industry

+8.9
+6.9
+7.2
+12.8

+8.3
+7.7
+6.8
+10.8

Low Tax Cap on Health
Insurance:
Aggregate
Low-Wage Industry
Medium-Wage Industry
High-Wage Industry

+2.0
+0.0
+0.6
+5.3

+1.5
+0.2
+0.6
+4.3

Taxing All Benefits:
Aggregate
Low-Wage Industry
Medium-Wage Industry
High-Wage Industry

+19.0
+13.1
+14.8
+29.9

+17.6
+14.5
+13.9
+25.9

Notes: The "Aggregate" figures show average annual percentage
changes in federal revenues from the personal income tax that
are predicted under the specified policies. "Low-Wage Industry"
estimates show how the tax bill of the average worker in lowwage industries would change, and similarly for the "Medium-Wage
Industry" and "High-Wage Industry" estimates.
Source:

Woodbury and Huanti (1989).
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Table 1',
Effects of Poltcy Chenges on Fringe Benefit Quantities,
by Industry Groups

~ANEL

A:

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGES UNDER TAK SYSTEMS
EXISTING 1969 • 1982

Pollcyllndustr~

1986 Tax Reform:
Aggregate
Low'Wege Industrlel
Medlum'Wage Industries
Hlgh'Wage Industries

Health Insurance
Conte Ibut Ions:
Aggregate
Low-W.ge Indu.trlts
Medlum'Wage Industries
High-Wage Industries

Wages
+9.4
+5.0
+8.9
+13.5

Pensions
+0.9
+1.9
+0.5
+0.7

PANEL B:

Health
Insurance

.ow Tax C.p on Health Insurlnce:
Aggregate
Low-Wage Industries
Medium-Wege Indultrlea
High-Wage Industriel
laxing All Benefits:
Aggregate
Low-Wage Industries
N
N
Medlum-W.ge
Industries
0
~
High-Wage Industries

'5.8
-1.9
-6.0
-5.6

Hellth
Wa9e1

Taxing Health Insur.nce
Cont r Ibut Ions:
Aggreg.te
Low-Wege Industries
Med IunH/.ge· Indus t r IIS
Hlgh-Wege Industrlel

-22.3
-20.0
-19.9
-26.2

'0.7
-0.4
-0_5
• 1•1

'4.3
-5.9
'3.7

·17.3
'12.8
·13.9
·U.9

-0.1
-0_0
-0.0
'0.3

-1. .,
-0.5
'0.9
-2.5

'8.7
-1.7
-5_1
'13.5

-0.4
-0.9
'0.7
-2.8

-48.8
-68.4
'52.3
-42.9

-20.1
-15.9
·16.7
-23.9

Low
-0.4
-1.0
-0.7
-2.1

-0.8
"",0.8
-0.2
-3.0

'2_6
-11.5
'5.5
-14.8

-64.1
'81.1
-70.2
'57.2

Insurance

Po l i eyll nduB try

~Ionl

+10.4
+8.2
+11.3
+10.4

~axlng

·1.7
'0.7
-1.5
-2.9

PERCENTAGE CHANGES UNDER 1986 TAX REFORM

·13.9
-" .5
-13.2
'28.1

-27.9
-19.8
-24.9
-32.7

Cap on Health Insurance:
Aggregate
LOW-Wage Indultries
Medium-Wage Industries
Hlgh-Wege Industrlel

-4.7

'IX

Taxing All Benefits:
Aggregate
Low-Wage Industries
Medlum-"Igt Industries
Hlgh-"age Industrlel

80

"
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Table 11
(continued)
The figures show how the specified tax-policy changes would alter compensation quantities. Panel A show changes under the tax systems in effect
during 1969·198Z. Panel 8 shows changes under the current tax system. All changes Ire total effects (Bum of substitution, ordinary income, end extrl
income effects) in annual percentag0 terms.

~:

Sources:

Woodbury and Huang (1989).
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Figure 1
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NOTES

1.

It is important to distinguish between tax-exempt benefits and tax-

deferred benefits.

Health insurance is an example of a tax-exempt

benefit--health insurance contributions ere not treated as taxable
income under the fedet&l personal income tax.
an

examp~e

Pel\sion contributions are

of a tax-deferred benefit--although pension contributions are

not treated as taxable income at the time they are made, pension
benefits are taxed when the employee receives them in retirement.

See,

for example, Korczyk 1984.

2.

The following discussion draws on Hart, Bell, Frees, Kawasaki, and

Woodbury, 1988.

3.

In preparing the figures in Table 1, the reclassification of U.S.

NWLCs by the European Communities methOd, as
Hact (1984), has been followed closely.

pres~nted

in Tahle A2.6 of

Since Hart's Table A2.6 is

written with specific reference to the Chamber of Commerce Data, no
special comment is required regarding the Chamber of Commerce Figures
shown in Table 1.

However, usc of the National Income and Product

Accounts data required some minor reclassification that shvuld be
mentioned.

For the Accounts data, Statutory Social Welfare Costs equa.

Employer Contributions for Social Insurance (from Accounts Table 6.12)
plus Worker's C<:-mpensati.on (Ar.colants Table 6.1:».
~'3lfare

Voluntary Social

Costs equal Other Labor Income of Private Domestic Industries

minus Workers'

Comper.sati~n

(Accounts Table 6.13).
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Not€ that because

Social Welfare Costs are the only NWLCs enumerated

i~l

the Accounts,

Total social welfare costs (row b) and Total NWLC,.. (row h) are the same
for the Accounts.

4.

Detailed definitions of

5.

These figures are derived for each of the one-digit industries

e~ch

category are given in the table notes.

reported in the U.S. National Income and Product Accuunts in five
selected years spanning the mid-1960s through 1985.

The figur.es

displayed are based on methods developed in Hart (1984, Table 2.8, p.

l7) and are conceptually similar to Hart's "Fixed

~C

In and "Ratio I

(fixed/variable)" measures in that they exclude pay for time not worked,
and hence implicitly treat pay for time not worked as a variable cost.
Specifically, the

fig~res

take fixed NWLCs to be

~mployer contr1butiol~

to state Unemployment Insurance, Supplemental Unemployment Insurance
Benefits, Pensions, Health Insurance, and Life Insurance.

In terms of

the Accounts, then, fixed NWLCs are Unemployment Insurance plus Other
Labor Income minus Workers' Compensation.

Variable NWLCs, on the other

hand, are Employer Contributions to Social Security (OASDHI) and
Workers' Compensation.
are Social Insurance

plus Workers'

Again in terms of the Accounts, variable NWLCs

cont~ibutiorLs

Compe~sation.

(excluding Unemployment Insurance)

Because the 'ccounts do not enumerate each

required item by industry, it was necessary to impute Unemployment
Insurance and Workers
by using

Compen.c;ation by industry.

indus~·y~level

This was s.ccomplished

data from the Chamber of Commerce.

Specifically, the ratio of Ul contributions to the sum of VI and Social
2207
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__._" _

Security contributions was computed by industry in the Chamber of
Commerce data, and the ratio applied to the Accounts figure for
Contributions

fo~ Su~ial

Insurance, in order to obtain an estimate of UI

contributions by inuustry.

Also, a similar ratio was constructed for

Workers' Compensation contributions and applied to the AccoUuts data in
order to obtain an estimate of Workers' Compensation contributions by
industry.

6.

Unions may nevertheless influence employee benefit provision by

negotiating new kindu of benefits that are later adopted in the nonunion
sector.

Indeed, this is clearly the role unions have played

historically, as Witll pensions.

7.

An except.ion is the paper by Turner (1987).

a.

Anothbt' factor that may have contributed to the peaking of the

employee benefi.t share in 1982 is the boom in the stock market that took
place in the mid-1980s.
the increase 1n

.~tock

Since the value of pension funds increased with

prices, it was possible for employers to make

smaller incremental contributions to pension funds to cover thei.r
pension liabilities (Munnell 1987).

The model discussed here does not

include a varlable capturing the influence of the stock mark€t on
pension contributions, but we consider this an important topic for

•....

future resea:rch.
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9.
cost

It should be noted that a variety of trends·-such as health-care
managemer.~

and benefit redesign (including the movement to defined-

contribution pension plans)·-should be viewed as manifestations of the
slowing growth of employee beneiit&, rather than as causes of that
slowi.ug growth.

10,

Similar arguments have been made. about employer-provided pensions

(Munnell 1984, 1985,

198~).

It has usually gone unmentioned that lump-

sum taxes are at best difficult to implement, and that efficient
government provision of health care
enta1l~

11.

servic~s

(as of any good or service)

myriad organizational problems.

Taylor and Wilensky

(1983)~

Phelps (1984-85), and Adamache and

Sloan (1985) offer estimates of the revenue effects of taKing health
benefits; however, because they consider only
benefits and wages, these
overstate the l.'evenue

~tudies

gE',irlS

tradeoff~

between health

are open to the criticism that they

of taxing health contributions.
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Appendix A.
Data Problems

Employoe~Benefit

Tracking employee benefits in the U.S. poses a severe problem
because government efforts to maintain suitable stati&tics have been
sporadic.

The National Income and Product Accounts are a good source of

data on employer contributions to both legally mandated and voluntary
social welfare programs, but the Accounts suffer from omission of other
types of nonwage labor costs.

Specifically, the Accounts subsume

payments for days not worked and in-kind benefits under direct wage and
salary payments.

Also, the Accounts have no counterpart to various

other expp.nses of a social nature or to vocatiollal training.

These

deficiencies are augmented by a reluctance of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce to publish detailed data.
For example, although the Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes a series
on Employer Contribution to Social Insurance (Table 6.12) by one-digit

•

industry, it does not disaggregate

I.'

-:"se contributions into their

components-·chiefly contributions to social security (OASDHI) and
unemployment insurance.

Similarly, although the Bureau of Economic

Analysis does disaggregate Ocher Labor Income--composed mainly of
contributions to pensions, health insurance, life insurance, workers'
compensation, and supplemental unemployment insurance--into its
components on an economy-wide basis, it does nut publish disaggregations
by industry.

Although it is possible to adjust the Accounts data using

other data sources in order to partially overcome these aggregation

2210
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problems. the usefulness of the Accounts remains limited for many
research efforts.
It is worth noting that the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Labor gathered excellent data on employe; benefits
about a decade.

fo~

It is unfortunate that the Survey of Employer

Expenditures for Employer Compensation was gathered only from 1966
through 1977.

Since 1977, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has gathered

data for the Employment Cost Index, but these data are published in a
way that makes them extremely awkward to use.
(1987) has noted, the micro data underlying

Moreover, as Ehrenberg

Employr~ent

Cost Index

figures have not been made available to researchers.
Because of the lack of current

goverl~ent

statistics on employee

benefits, the private U.S. Chamber of Commerce has gathered data on
benefits since the late-l940s.

The Chamber of Commerce data have the

advantage that they are the only available source of data for several
types of benefits, such as payments for

d~ys

not worked, in-kind

benefits, other expenses of a social nature, and vocational training.
However, they have the disadvantage that they are taken from a
self-reported survey of a self-selected sample of employers.
result, they pose four problems.

As a

First, the composition of the sample

has changed over time, and year-to-year changes that are observed may be
sensitive to that changing composition.

Second, in any given year, the

figures shown in the Chamber of Commerce survey seem not to represent
average labor costs of U.S. employers, again because of self-selection
in response (see Hart and others 1988).

Thir~,

cross-sectional

comparisons of industries or groups of workers may be distorted by which
2211
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employers in each industry choose to respond to the survey.

Finally,

self-reporting could give rise to various biases that can only be
guessed at.

All of these problems Guggest that the Chamber of Commerce

survey could give a biased picture of employee benefits in the

u.s.

Various ways of benchmarking the Chamber of Commerce data so as to
overcome the sampling bias that exists in the data have been explored.
Unfortunately, these attempts have not been successful to date.

The

basic strategy of benchmarking would be to find elements of the Chamber
of Commerce data that are shared with scientifically-sampled surveys
such as the National Income and Product Accounts and the Survey of
Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation (the survey that enued
Ij~l compD.rin~

:f.n 1977).
in both the

Chambe~

the components of compensation that arA reported

of Commerce and the scientifically-sampled surveys,

it should in principle be possible to adjust the components of
compensation that are uniquely available in the Chamber of Commerce
survey.

Attempts to do just this have been unsuccessful for two

reasons.

First, the Chamber of Commerce data and the NatioGal Income

and Product Accouncs overlap only in two series--legally mandated and
voluntary contributions to social welfare programs.
series··legally

mand~ted

In one of theso

contributions··the two data sources are in

reasonable accord (see Table 1, row c).

In the cther ••voluntary social

welfare costs··they diverge in some years by over 25 perCetlt (se3 Table
1, row d).

How similar or divergent other series would be is a matter

of speculation; hence, it would be unwise to adjust all Chamber of
Commerce figures downward by some fixed percelltel.ge.

Second, use of the

Survey of Employer Expenditures for Employer Compensation as a benchmark
2212

...

has been

stymi~d

because that survey, contrary to the belief of many

researchers, appears not to be representative of the population of all
firms in the U.S.

The Employment Cost Index still ueeds to be fully

explored as a possible benchmark for the Chamber of Commerce data, but
this task, too, cannot be completed until the Bureau of Labor Statistics
makes available the employer data underlying the Employment Cost Index.
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Appendix B.
Studies of' the Tax Treatment of Employee Benefits:

A Review

Through 1987, there had appeared numerous studies of the influence
of the favorable tax treatment of benefits on benefit levels or on the
mix of total compensation.

These include Alpert (1983), Atrostic

(1983), Holmer (1984), Leibowitz (1983), Long and Scott (1982), Sloan
and Adamache (1986), Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Turner (1987), Vromal1
and Anderson (1984), and Woodbury (1983).

Some additional studies

(Goldstein and Pauly 1976; Mumy and Manson 1985) attempted to draw
inferences about the effects of taxes on benefits, but did so without
including explicit tax measures.
The studies that included explicit tax measures took essentially
one of two empirical approaches.

The first was to regress (for an

individual or a group) a measure of the level of employer contributions
to all employee benefits (FB), or pension benefits (PS), or health
insurance benefits (HB) on a measure of the marginal tax rate facing the
group (or individual) and a vector of control variables:

...

(1)

(2)

(3)

where t is the marginal tax rate facing the group or individual, tile
represent (m •

1)

control variables, the

al'

b1 , and c 1 are

coefficients, and the e 1 are normally distributed error terms.
procedure or some variant of it was followed by Atrostic (1983),

2214
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This
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Leibowitz (1983), Sloan and Adamache (1986), Taylor and Wilensky (1983),
and Vroman and Anderson (1984).
The alternative approach was to use as a dependent variable in
equations like (1), (2), and (3) not the level of benefits per worker,
but the share of total compensation received by workers as employee
benefits, pension benefits, or cOl1tributions to health insurance.
Usually these shares have been specified as:

(4)

FB/Te - FB/(FB + WS)

(5)

PB/Te - PB/(PB + WS)

(6)

HB/TC - HS/(RB + WS),

where TC refers to total compensation per worker, and WS are wage and
salary payments per worker.

This approach or some variant of it was

taken by Alpert (1983), Long and Scott

(1~82),

(1986), Turner (1987), and Woodbury (1983).

Sloan and Adamache

One possible advantage of

this latter approach was that it could be shown to have an explicit llnk
to well-known consumer theoretic

mode~s

(Woodbury 1983).

These two approaches and the stUdies based on them shared an
important weakness that needed to be corrected:

Essentially, none

considered that the costs of providing benefits differ across benefits,
over time, by size of firm, and by region.

The effect of this

deficiency was that none of these studies was able
tradeoff

bet~een

any

~

estimate a

of employee benefits (for example, between

pensions and health insurance).
no~e

t~

Among other things, this meant that

of the above studies was of use in estimating the effect of a

change in tax policy that would be specific to just one benefit (a tax
cap on health insurance contributions, for example) on the amount of
2215
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some other benefit provided by the employer. 11 Neither would any of the
early studies be of use in determining whether

th~

impact of taxing both

pensions and health insurance would have a different impact on the
provisio~

of

pen~ions

than on the provision of health insurance.

The same deficiency implies that the early studies may have
obtained biased estimates of tax effects on employee benefits as a whole
(or on a single specific benefit).
untenable simplifying assumptions

In effect. the early studies made
abou~

the rate at which the employer

is willing to trade health for pension benefits.
omitted

varia~les

This creates an

bias that could. in principle, lead to mistaken

inferences about the relation between taxes and employee benefits.
Another deficiency shared by most of the early studies is that they
had difficulty separating income effects from tax (or pricesubstitution) effects on the provision of nonwage benefits.

In

so~e

studies, income effects were ignored, and in most studies where they
were distinguished, collinearity between income and marginal tax rates
frustrated the effort.

The reason for the difficulty is that incomes

and marginal tax rates tend to change together over time; even in
cross-section there is a close relation between the income and marginal
tax rates faced by a
econometl"ic

househ~ld.

(~st1mation.

This close

r~lation

poses problems for

The work by Woodbury and Huang (1988, 1989),

which is relied upon in the main text, represents an attempt to overcome
some of the problems encountered

in the earlier studies.
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